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I. INTRODUCTION

For forty years, a heated debate has revolved around the interpretation of
seven words found in section 2-313 of the Uniform Commercial Code. These
words, "part of the basis of the bargain,"' provide a necessary element for
affirmations, descriptions, and samples to become express warranties that
obligate sellers to buyers. 2
The debate centers on whether these words require a buyer to rely on the
seller's representations to maintain an action for breach of an express warranty
and, if so, to what extent the buyer must prove reliance. Unfortunately, the
words, by themselves, are quite unclear,3 leading to strong disagreement

1. U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(a) (1987).
2. Specifically, § 2-313 provides:
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which
relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates
an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or
promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates
an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to the sample
or model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use
formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a specific
intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the goods
or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of
the goods does not create a warranty.
U.C.C. § 2-313 (1987).
3. See, e.g., JOHN M. STOCKTON, SALES IN A NUTSHELL 181 (2d ed. 1981) (noting that
"Mhe 'basis of the bargain' language is new. At common law and under the Sales Act there had
to be 'reliance' by the buyer on a promise or affirmation fact. The extent to which the 'basis of
the bargain' test changes the 'reliance' test is not clear."); JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S.
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-5, at 398 (3d ed. 1988) (indicating that the extent
to which the addition of the words "part of the basis of the bargain" changed the law is
"thoroughly unclear"); Thomas W. Coffey, CreatingExpressWarrantiesUnderthe U. C. C:Basis
of the Bargain - Don't Rely on It, 20 U.C.C. L.J. 115, 117 (1987) (noting that "the case law
interpreting the new basis of the bargain concept is strikingly and embarrassingly split and
unclear"); Steven Z. Hodaszy, Express Warranties Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Is
There A RelianceRequirement?, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 468, 476 (1991) (noting that "[t]his phrase
continues to be a source of confusion and contention.... ."); Wayne K. Lewis, Towarda Theory
of Strict "Claim" Liability: Warranty Relieffor Advertising Representations,47 OHIO ST. L.J.
671, 686 (1986) (stating that the significance of adding the words "part of the basis of the
bargain" remains "unsettled in both the literature on the subject and in the courtroom"); John E.
Murray Jr., "Basis of the Bargain": TranscendingClassicalConcepts, 66 MINN. L. REV. 283,
304 (1982) (noting that "[a] summary of the case law adumbration of 'basis of the bargain'
reveals mass confusion and little assistance."); Douglas Whitman, Reliance as an Element in
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among court 4 and numerous commentators5 as to the words' exact meaning.
Given the potentially powerful reach of section 2-3136 and the potentially

Product MisrepresentationSuits: A Reconsideration, 35 Sw. L.J. 741, 749-50 (1981) (noting

"some confusion" in the courts over whether reliance must be established in cases involving §
2-313 of the U.C.C.).
4. For a list of cases interpreting the words "part of the basis of the bargain" as requiring
buyers to prove reliance, see infra note 67. For a list of "no reliance" cases that do not require
buyers to prove reliance, see infra note 106.
5. Several commentators argue that reliance is still generally required in § 2-313 cases. See
2 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, Uniform Commercial Code Series (Sales) § 2-313:05, at 437-38
(1993); WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 9-5 at 403; and Hodaszy, supra note 3. Other
commentators argue that § 2-313 generally does not require reliance. See, e.g., Coffey, supra
note 3, at 124; Whitman, supra note 3, at 742; Murray, supra note 3, at 284; ROBERT J. NORDSTROM, LAw OF SALES §§ 66-68 (1970) (stating that the Code dropped the reliance test,
maintaining it only for implied warranties); Morris G. Shanker, The Seller's Contractual
Obligation Under U.C.C. 2-313 to Tell the Truth, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 40 (1987)
(discussing the "basis of the bargain" language as evidence of the Code drafters' intent to provide
a different test for express warranties); Charles A. Heckman, "Reliance" Or "Common Honesty
of Speech": The History and Interpretationof Section 2-313 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
38 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1, 39 (1987) (acknowledging that commentators are not letting go of
the reliance concept). Some commentators take no official position. See Lewis, supra note 3,
at 691; Richard A. Lord, Some ThoughtsAbout WarrantyLaw: Express and Implied Warranties,

56 N.D. L.REv. 509 (1980); see also Marshall S. Shapo,AdvertisingandtheLiability ofProduct
Sellers, 21 PROD. SAFETY AND LIAB. REP. (BNA) 510, 512 (May 7, 1993) (noting the split in
opinion on the reliance requirement); Victor E. Schwartz, Violation of Express Warranty: A
Useful Tort That Must Be Kept Within Rational Boundaries, 3 PROD. LIAB. L.J. 147 (1992)
(discussing the reliance requirement under the tort theory of express warranties); Matthew A.
Victor, Express Warranties Underthe U. C. C.-RelianceRevisited, 25 NEw ENG. L. REv. 477
(1990) (contendingthat the U.C.C. has dropped the reliance requirement but the courts have not).
6. According to Victor Schwartz, an industry lawyer and author of one of the leading tort
textbooks, express warranty litigation may well become the "-1990's darling of the organized
plaintiffs' bar" for two reasons:
First, from the plaintiffs['] lawyer point of view, express warranty claims are the
very least expensive way to try a product liability lawsuit. All the plaintiffs['] lawyer
needs to prove is the advertising statement, its violation, and the causal relationship
between his client's injury and that violation - very often an expert will not be
required,
Second, and of greatest importance, is the tremendous legal punch behind express
warranty claims. If one can prove the basic elements of the tort, it is virtually
defenseless. For example, in almost every jurisdiction, "state of the art," however
broadly construed, is no defense to an express warranty claim. In other words, one
cannot defend a case by proving that it was absolutely impossible under the science
of the time to make a product as safe as the express warranty suggested. One cannot
defend a case by showing that a manufacturer legitimately and sincerely believed the
statement about safety to be true. Also, plaintiff's fault, usually, is not a defense.
Express warranty can overcome the "assumption of the risk defense," if the plaintiff
can show that he was really told by the express warranty that there was no risk.
Express warranty also can withstand the defense of contributory fault.
Schwartz, supra note 5, at 155 (footnotes omitted). Schwartz notes these features of express
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large sums of money at stake in express warranty litigation,7 it is not
surprising that so many voices have been heard on the topic.
The issue of reliance arises most starkly in cases involving advertisements, catalogs, and warranty cards placed inside packages. The following
hypothetical illustrates this point. Assume that a buyer does not see an express
warranty in an advertisement, catalog, or brochure until after purchasing a
product. Can the buyer, notwithstanding the failure to discover the seller's
representations before the sale, maintain a claim under section 2-313 based on
these representations if the representations turn out to be untrue?
For reasons discussed in this article, the answer is that the buyer should
be permitted to recover despite his or her non-reliance on the warranty. Those
courts and commentators who insist on a showing of reliance advance an
unworkable and unfair test that, if followed to its logical extreme, would
eliminate most express warranties from the marketplace. This point becomes
evident when examining a data source that commentators and courts have
overlooked in the section 2-313 debate - empirical studies relating to "realworld" consumer behavior. Unfortunately, the most recent draft revisions
of section 2-313 fail to take proper notice of these studies and fall short in
resolving the Code's frustrating ambiguity regarding reliance. 9
This article reviews the legislative history and the courts' interpretations
of section 2-313, demonstrates how recent empirical studies show the illogic
of applying a reliance requirement for the section, discusses recent proposals
to amend section 2-313, and recommends an alternative approach. In
recommending a carefully measured approach to abolish reliance, the article
makes clear that such a step presents little risk of opening the floodgates to
numerous meritless warranty claims.

warranty with concern, arguing that they call for "rational and reasonable boundaries," including
retaining the reliance requirement. Id. at 156.
7. For example, the potential liability of the tobacco industry would run into the hundreds
of millions, if not billions, of dollars should it be found that companies, such as the Liggett
Group in Cipollonev. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), rev'don othergrounds,
112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992), made express warranties in their advertising.
8. See infra notes 127-53 and accompanying text.
9. At the time the author submitted this article for publication, he sent extensive excerpts of
it to the Reporter in charge of revising Article 2. In the author's view, the draft revisions as of
February 17, 1993, continued the Code's improper focus on reliance. Subsequently, as of
September 10, 1993, a much improved version that purports to abolish reliance in public
advertising cases, has circulated. Unfortunately, even this improved version contains excessive
ambiguity. Even more unfortunate, while expanding consumers' rights with respect to reliance,
the draft substantially diminishes consumer rights with respect to privity in revised § 2-318 by
excluding from warranty protection "fanily members, bystanders and the like." See infra note
206 and accompanying text.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss3/3
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II. THE HISTORY OF SECTION 2-313

The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and
the American Law Institute promulgated the Uniform Commercial Code in
1951.0 Article 2 governs the sale of goods."t Section 2-313 defines the
method of creating express warranties in the sale of goods. 2 The history of
section 2-313 provides guidance for understanding the issue of reliance.
A.

THE UNIFORM SALES ACT AND THE UNIFORM REVISED SALES ACT

The Code's predecessor was the Uniform Sales Act (USA), drafted by
Professor Samuel Williston 13 in 1906.4 Section 12 of the Uniform Sales
Act provided with respect to express warranties:
Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the
goods is an express warranty if the natural tendency of such affirmation or
promise is to induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and if the buyer
purchases the goods relying thereon. No affirmation of the value of the
goods, nor any statement purporting to be a statement of the seller's
opinion only shall be construed as a warranty. 15
No one disputes that section 12 required reliance on the part of the buyer
to maintain a breach of express warranty claim. What is disputed is the
meaning of the change in language from section 12 to section 2-313 of the
U.C.C. Section 2-313, in contrast to section 12 of the USA, never mentions
"reliance." Section 2-313 requires only that a seller's affirmations, descriptions, or samples be a "part of the basis of the bargain" for a buyer to bring
an express warranty claim.
Commentators have explored the historical record of section 2-313 to
16
determine whether its drafters intended to retain the reliance requirement.
Interestingly, the two who appear to have delved most deeply, Professor
Charles Heckman and Professor Steven Hodaszy, reach diametrically opposite

10. Hodaszy, supra note 3, at 469 n.2. Every state except Louisiana has adopted the code,
with minor variations. Id. Although the U.C.C. establishes a comprehensiveset ofuniform state
laws on commercial transactions, it excludes things such as the sale of realty, insurance contracts,
and bankruptcy. White & Summers, supra note 3, § 2.
11. U.C.C. § 2-102 (1987).
12. Id. § 2-313.
13. See Heckman, supra note 5, at 3.
14. The Uniform Sales Act was enacted in 34 states. Robert Braucher, The Legislative
History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 798, 799 (1958).
15. UNIU. SALEs AcT § 12 (1906) (amended 1941) (emphasis added).
16. See, e.g., Heckman, supra note 5, at 3-18; Hodaszy, supra note 3, at 469-75; Murray,
supra note 3, at 285-91; Whitman, supra note 3, at 750.
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conclusions. By focusing on preliminary versions of the U.C.C. and
examining the writings of its principal drafters, Chief Reporter Karl Llewelyn
and Assistant Reporter Soia Mentschikoff, Professor Heckman concludes that
the drafters intended to expunge reliance from section 2-313.11 Professor
Hodaszy, in looking to the writings of Samuel Williston, contends that the
U.C.C incorporates Williston's view that the law should moderate, but not
eliminate, the reliance requirement in express warranties., 8
Both authors note that Professor Williston voiced dissatisfaction with the
courts' early reading of the requirement for reliance as he wrote it in section
12 of the Uniform Sales Act.19 In implementing section 12, the courts
initially required plaintiffs to demonstrate that the sole or primary inducement
that led them to make a purchase was the representation that gave rise to the
express warranty claim.2" Williston criticized these early rulings:
There is danger of giving greater effect to the requirement of reliance
than it is entitled to. Doubtless, the burden of proof is on the buyer to
establish this as one of the elements of his case. But the warranty need not
be the sole inducement to the buyer to purchase the goods; and as a
general rule no evidence of reliance by the buyer is necessary other than
the seller's statements were of a kind which naturally would induce the
2
buyer to purchase the goods and that he did purchase the goods. '
To Hodaszy, Williston's words suggest a two-part reliance test.
contends Williston advocated the following approach:

He

If a seller's affirmation had the "natural tendency" to induce reliance that is, if it would induce a reasonable person in the situation of the
purchaser to buy the goods - then no proof of actual reliance was
required. If, however, such a "natural tendency" could not be shown,
plaintiff bore the burden of proving actual reliance.2
The Uniform Sales Act was amended in 1944 and became the Uniform
Revised Sales Act (URSA). The words "basis of the bargain" are used with
respect to express warranties for the first time in section 37 of the URSA.23

17. See Heckman, supra note 5, at 28.
18. See Hodaszy, supra note 3, at 472-75 (Noting that "[iln short, there is powerful historical
evidence that U.C.C. section 2-313 was intended to adopt Williston's ...reliance test"). Id. at
475.
19. See Heckman, supra note 5, at 5; Hodaszy, supra note 3, at 472.
20. For a list of these early cases, see Hodaszy, supra note 3, at 471 n.16.
21. Id. at 472 n.18, quoting SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW GOvERNING SALES OF GooDs
AT COMMON LAW AND UNDER THE UNIFORM SALEs AcT § 206 (rev. ed. 1948).
22. Id. at 472 (footnotes omitted).
23. Section 37 read:

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss3/3
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According to Hodaszy, the drafters of the URSA incorporated Williston's twopart reliance test in section 37.24 In particular, he points to a comment to
section 37 that states:
In life, affirmations of fact which relate to the goods and which are made
by a seller in connection with a bargain about goods are taken as part of
the description of the goods contracted about; in life, no particular reliance
needs to be shown in order to weave such affirmations into the fabric of
the agreement. Instead, what needs an affirmative showing is that there
has been any fact which gives clear objective justification for the unusual
5
result of taking such affirmations out of what has been agreed upon.2
To Hodaszy, this comment indicates that reliance remains essential for express
warranties, but that the burden of proof shifts to defendant sellers to
demonstrate non-reliance by buyers. Hodaszy argues that section 37,
containing only a few technical revisions, eventually became section 2-313 of
the Uniform Commercial Code. Accordingly, he concludes that the drafters
intended to adopt Williston's two-part test in section 2-313.1
Professor Heckman has a different interpretation of the legislative history
and wording of section 37 of the URSA. He notes that Karl lewelyn, one of
the principal drafters of the U.C.C.,27 also principally drafted the URSA.
In section 37, Llewelyn and his colleagues did far more than simply clarify the
role of reliance in express warranties. To the contrary, they moved warranties
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise which relates to the goods and is made
by the seller to the buyer as a part of the bargain creates an express
warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made a basis of the bargain creates
an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made a basis of the bargain creates an
express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to the sample
or model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use
formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a specific
intention to make a warranty. No affirmation merely of the value of the goods
and no statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation
of the goods creates a warranty.
Id. at 474 n.29 (quoting UNIF. REVISED SALES Acr § 37 (1944 draft).
24. Hodaszy, supra note 3, at 475.
25. Id. at 474 (citing UNIF. REVISED SALEs Acr § 37 comment). Heckman looks at the same
words, but reaches a different conclusion. See infra notes 27-36 and accompanying text.
26. See Hodaszy, supra note 3, at 475.
27. Heckman quotes Grant Gilmore as saying: "Make no mistake: this Code was Llewelyn's
Code; there is not a section, there is hardly a line, which does not bear his stamp and impress;
from beginning to end he inspired, directed and controlled it." Gilmore, In Memoriam: Karl
Liewelyn, 71 YALE L.J. 813, 814 (1962), quoted in Heckman, supra note 5, at 2 n.4.
Published by Scholar Commons, 1994
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of descriptions, samples, and models - which previously were considered

implied warranties not requiring reliance under the Uniform Sales Act, from other sections of the Uniform Sales Act29 into section 37 of the URSA.
Heclkman argues that Llewelyn retained the "no reliance required" feature of
the implied warranties of descriptions, samples, and models, extending the

feature to the affirmations and promises in Section 12 of the Uniform Sales
0
Act.
Heckman buttresses his argument by pointing to a case, Alaska Pacific
Salmon Co. v. Reynolds Metals Co.,31 that particularly concerned Karl
Llewelyn and Soia Mentschikoff, the drafters of the U.C.C. In Alaska Pacific
Salmon, the Second Circuit ruled that the plaintiff could not hold the defendant
to representations contained in a letter transmitted after the parties entered into
a contract for the purchase of packaging for dehydrated soups. The plaintiffs
had vigorously argued that the parties did not reach contractual agreement until
after the letter containing the representations arrived. 32 Inexplicably,
according to Heckman, the court rejected these arguments and selected as the

"magical moment of contract" a date that neither plaintiffs nor defendants
likely would have chosen. 3 Mentschikoff took part in the trial and appeal

28. See Heckman at 9-12.
29. Former sections 14 (implied warranties by description) and 16 (implied warranties by
sample or model) of the Uniform Sales Act were incorporated as express warranties in section
37 of the Uniform Revised Sales Act. See id. at 9-10.
30. Heckman quotes the same language in the comment to section 37 of the Uniform Revised
Sales Act invoked by Hodaszy. See supra notes 23 & 25. However, Heckman reaches the
opposite conclusion:
"This comment also makes another important matter perfectly clear: reliance is no
longer the crucial factor in express warranty. Unfortunately, even though equivalent
language was carried over in the final comment 3 to section 2-313, modern courts
have not always accepted it seriously." Heckman at 14. Heckman also points to the
fact that section 37(1)(a), which formerly presented the only way to create an express
warranty, does not use the term "basis of the bargain." On the other hand, sections
37(1)(b) and (1)(c), which formerly concerned implied warranties not requiring
reliance, use the term "basis of the bargain." Section 2-313 extends the term "basis
of the bargain" to all three types of warranty. This suggests to Heckman that the
term, when extended to § 37(1)(a) warranties, carries no reliance requirement.
Id. at 12-14.
31. 163 F.2d 643 (2d Cir. 1948).
32. Id. at 643.
33. See Heckman, supranote 5, at 21. As Heckman observes, the court's analysis was overly
technical and unfair:
This kind of analysis was exactly what the drafters of the U.C.C. were trying to
make irrelevant. This is a laborious common law [sic] type of analysis: offer,
counter-offer, and finally acceptance. The magical moment of contract appears, in
this analysis, to be April 7. Nothing would have surprised the plaintiff or defendant
more, at the time of their dealings, than to realize that their legal rights were being
permanently shaped by a letter which purported neither to make nor accept an offer,

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss3/3
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on behalf of the unsuccessful plaintiffs.34
Heckman contends that, in drafting section 2-313 and other sections of the
Code, Llewelyn and Mentschikoff sought to ensure that rulings based on
extremely technical notions of offer and acceptance would not occur under a
modem U.C.C. In particular, Heckman argues that comment 7 to section 231335 reflects Llewelyn's and Mentschikoff's desire to provide greater
flexibility to buyers seeking to hold sellers to promises made during discussions relating to a sale - even those promises technically made after the
closing of a deal when no reliance by the buyer could have occurred.3 6 In
Heckman's view, one important step that Llewelyn and Mentschikoff took in
promoting this greater flexibility was the abolition of reliance.
Although Hodaszy's and Heckman's resort to historical analysis seem
plausible, both cannot be correct. Unfortunately, neither analysis is dispositive
in any "smoking gun" sense. Each looks at the same words, but each reaches
a different conclusion regarding the drafters' intentions.37 If one reviews
Hodaszy's and Heckman's arguments, one does find convincing the notion that
Williston, the author of the Uniform Sales Act, considered reliance to be

but in fact was merely trying to make a trivial adjustment in the wording to be printed
on the package.
Id. By focusing on this date, the court excluded the later representations by the defendant that,
according to Llewelyn, should have governed the terms of the deal. Heckman argues that
Llewelyn ensured, in § 2-313, that no technical cut-off date for contract formation would defeat
an appropriate express warranty claim. Id. at 21-25.
34. Id. at 18.
35. Comment 7 states:
The precise time when words of description or affirmation are made or samples
are shown is not material. The sole question is whether the language or samples or
models are fairly to be regarded as part of the contract. If language is used after the
closing of the deal (as when the buyer when taking delivery asks and receives an
additional assurance), the warranty becomes a modification, and need not be
supported by consideration if it is otherwise reasonable and in order (Section 2-209).
U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 7 (1987).
36. According to Heckman:
The Alaska Pacificcase ... contains a general lesson for interpreting the Code's
language in section 2-313. Today one views the Code through a glass highly colored
by the pro-consumer activities of the last twenty years. The Code was drafted, in
fact, to cope with problems of merchants, as typified by Alaska Pacific, as well as
the problems of consumers. The language of comment 7 to section 2-313 (dealing
with the timing of warranty creation) makes much more sense if viewed in terms of
Alaska Pacific rather than in terms of a consumer who buys a can of paint at the
hardware store and gets an assurance from the clerk as he leaves the front door.
Heckman, supra note 5, at 24-25 (footnotes omitted).
37. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. Hodaszy insists that these words incorporate
a two-part reliance test fashioned by Williston. Id. Heckman argues that the comment makes an
"important matter perfectly clear: reliance is no longer the crucial factor in express warranty."
Heckman, supranote 5, at 14.
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essential to the creation of an express warranty." However, this conclusion
falls far short of resolving the debate. The more critical question is whether
Llewelyn, the drafter of the U.C.C., intended to adopt or abandon Williston's
views regarding reliance. The answer to this question is less clear.
Heckman's argument that Llewelyn wished to discard reliance when he drafted
the U.C.C. is plausible but speculative, because Llewelyn did not clearly and
unequivocally abandon reliance. Ultimately, insufficient evidence exists in the
historical record to prove the matter conclusively.
Further, given the lack of precise explanations in the words and comments
of the Uniform Revised Sales Act and the Uniform Commercial Code
regarding reliance and express warranties, Hodaszy and Heckman engage in
substantial speculation regarding the motives of the drafters and the meanings
of their words. Carefully considering the two commentators' analyses and
finding no clear answer, one turns to the courts' interpretations of section 2313 and to policy considerations surrounding the section.

B. THE

LANGUAGE AND COMMENTS OF SECTION

2-313

Although section 2-313 does not clearly spell out the U.C.C.'s position
regarding reliance, examining the words and the several comments39 to this
section is useful.
To begin, there is little doubt that section 2-313 no longer contains the
explicit requirement for reliance found in section 12 of the Uniform Sales Act.
What has been substituted, however, is difficult to discern by reading the new
words. How does an affirmation of fact or a promise relating to goods
become "part of the basis of the bargain?" The abandonment of the explicit
reliance words suggests, at a minimum, that a different and less demanding
requirement exists in place of reliance. What this requirement is and how
much less demanding simply cannot be determined from the words of section
2-313.
Several comments to section 2-313 raise the issue of reliance. Comment
3 states:
The present section deals with affirmations of fact by the seller,
descriptions of the goods or exhibitions of samples, exactly as any other
part of a negotiation which ends in a contract is dealt with. No specific
intention to make a warranty is necessary if any of these factors is made
part of the basis of the bargain. In actual practice affirmations of fact
made by the seller about the goods during a bargain are regarded as part

38. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of Williston's views.
39. Although comment language does not carry the same weight as the enacted language of
the Code, the comments were drafted by the same individuals who wrote the Code and therefore
carry enormous persuasive effect. See Murray, supra note 3, at 287, n.20.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss3/3
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of the description of those goods; hence no particularreliance on such
statements need be shown in order to weave them into the fabric of the
agreement. Rather, any fact which is to take such affirmations, once made,
out of the agreement requires clear affirmative proof. The issue normally
is one of fact.'
Many words and phrases in this comment raise important questions.
When the comment refers to affirmations made by the seller about the goods
"during a bargain," does it refer solely to words spoken face-to-face with the
buyer? Might it include words in an advertisement, catalog, or brochure that
the buyer merely reads, but about which he or she does not dicker?
The answer clearly appears to be that an advertisement, catalog, or
brochure can contain representations that constitute an express warranty even
when a warranty is not intended.'" What is not clear, however, is whether
the buyer must read and rely on the words before entering into the contract.
White & Summers examine the language in comment 3 and place
themselves solidly in the "reliance is necessary" camp, stating:
It is clear that an advertisement can be a part of the basis of the
bargain, and it is only fair that it be so. However, the language in
Comment 3, from which some have found a presumption, is limited to
"affirmations of fact made by the seller about the goods during a bargain
...." In the usual case one would not regard an advertisement as being
made "during a bargain," and therefore no statement in an advertisement
would normally qualify for the presumption that may be authorized in

40. U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 3 (1987) (emphasis added).
41. Cases holding that statements made in advertisements, catalogs, or brochures can
constitute express warranties even though not specifically incorporated into a written contract
include: Neville Constr. Co. v. Cook Paint & Varnish Co., 671 F.2d 1107 (8th Cir. 1982);
Sylvestri v. Warner & Swasey Co., 398 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1968); Keith v. Buchanan, 220 Cal.
Rptr. 392 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Fundin v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 199 Cal. Rptr. 789
(Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Harris v. Belton, 65 Cal. Rptr. 808 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968); Crest Container
Corp. v. R.H. Bishop Co., 445 N.E.2d 19 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); Scheuler v. Aamco Transmissions, Inc., 571 P.2d 48 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977); Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., 209
N.W.2d 643 (Neb. 1973); Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 181 N.E.2d 399
(N.Y. 1962); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 147 N.E.2d 612 (Ohio 1958); Drier v.
Perfection, Inc., 259 N.W.2d 496 (S.D. 1977); see also Nordstrom, supra note 5, at 204 (noting
that statements "made in national advertising to the public generally" can constitute express
is clear that an
warranties); WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 9-5 at 401 (stating that "[i]t
advertisement can be part of the basis of the bargain, and it is only fair that it be so."); Lewis,
supra note 3, at 686 (noting that "courts have had little trouble finding that an advertisement,
although not part of the written contract, can nevertheless create express warranty liability, so
long as it is 'part of the basis of the bargain'"); Victor, supra note 5, at 499 (acknowledging that
"[riecently, the courts have with increasing frequency held that advertisements can create express
warranties even though the advertisements themselves might not become part of written
contracts.").
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Comment 3. At minimum a plaintiff in such a case should have to testify
that he (or his agent) knew of and relied upon the advertisement in making
the purchase. 42
Professor Heckman, invoking the writings of Karl Llewelyn, sharply
challenges White and Summers. He finds the use of the word "description"
in comment 3 to be particularly significant, stating:
Comment 3 to section 2-313 reads: "In actual practice affirmations of fact
made by the seller about the goods during a bargain are regarded as part
of the description of those goods; hence no particular reliance on such
statements need be shown in order to weave them into the fabric of the
agreement." What is the significance of calling such affirmations
descriptions? It is that under the Uniform Sales Act, description was an
implied warranty and the buyer had to show neither knowledge nor
reliance. Llewelyn regarded description as creating a warranty that the
parties could not avoid even by mutual consent: "Section 14 [of the
Revised Uniform Sales Act], then, requiring minimum flat compliance with
description, stands, it is submitted, as distinguished from 'merchantability'
and 'fitness for particular purpose' and 'express warranty,' in sense and
law - as an iron section." It is not conceivable that Llewelyn intended
that the U.C.C., his greatest statutory achievement, should disregard one
of his most firmly held views.43
Another set of words in comment 3 that adds to the confusion is
"particular reliance. " 4 Had the comment stated simply that "no reliance"
is necessary to weave affirmations of fact, descriptions of goods, or samples
into the fabric of the agreement, the debate over reliance might never have
arisen. Does the addition of "particular" to modify "reliance" indicate that
some type of reliance remains as an element of express warranties? Or, is the
word simply surplusage? Unfortunately, no convincing evidence to support
either view exists.
Comment 7 presents similar, if not more serious, problems of interpretation. Comment 7 states:
The precise time when words of description or affirmation are made
or samples are shown is not material.. The sole question is whether the
language or samples or models are fairly to be regarded as part of the
contract. If language is used after the closing of the deal (as when the
buyer when taking delivery asks and receives an additional assurance), the

42. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 9-5 at 401.
43. Hecklnan, supra note 5, at 38 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).

44. See U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 3 (1987).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss3/3
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warranty becomes a modification, and need not be supported by consideration if it is otherwise reasonable and in order (Section 2-209).' s
Not surprisingly, the significance of this comment has been hotly debated.
Professors White and Summers struggle to fit it into their conceptual
framework given the comment's apparent inconsistency with their notion that
reliance is required for a provision to form part of the contract. The idea that
one is potentially bound by a warranty made after a contract has been formed
makes little sense to them.46

Accordingly, they interpret the comment as

applying solely to "face-to-face dealings that occur while the deal is still
warm." 47 Any seller's statement "made more than a short period beyond the
conclusion of the agreement" should not be considered a warranty. 48 White
and Summers suggest that this approach "recognizes the practical realities even
49
though it does some violence to normal contract doctrine."
Professor Murray vigorously disputes their approach to comment 7,
asserting that their view represents an archaic interpretation of the Code. 0
Murray views comment 7 as fundamental evidence of "a novel concept of
bargain, a concept well beyond and different from a bargained-for-exchange
idea involving inducement or reliance.""' The fact that postformation
statements on which the buyer clearly did not rely when entering into the
contract can be considered integral parts of the contract strongly suggests to
him that section 2-313 of the Code has jettisoned reliance completely when
dealing with express warranties.52
Professor Hodaszy challenges Murray's position, arguing that the Code's
drafters would never base the Code "upon a radically different conception of
"3
'bargain' without articulating that conception anywhere in the Code.
Hodaszy interprets comment 7 in a more modest fashion. He argues that
comment 7 serves to rectify problems caused by the pre-existing duty rule,54

45. Id. § 2-313 cmt. 7 (emphasis added).
46. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 9-5 at 402 (stating that "[i]t is far from selfevident that a seller's post-sale words uttered during delivery are an 'agreement of modification,'
and one can hardly attribute that bilateral connotation to an advertisement that is not published
until after the sale.").
47. Id. § 9-5, at 402-03.
48. Id. at 403.
49. Id.
50. See infra notes 162-70 and accompanying text for a full discussion of Murray's views.
51. Murray, supra note 3, at 289.
52. See infra notes 162-68.
53. Hodaszy, supra note 3, at 508.
54. The pre-existing duty rule bars enforcement of new obligations based on prior legal or
contractual obligations. For example a law enforcement official generally cannot claim a reward
for capturing a criminal within the official's jurisdictionbecause the official, having an existing

duty to apprehend criminals, did not provide new consideration to support a contractual claim for
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which the drafters of the U.C.C. sought to eliminate. According to Hodaszy,
comment 7 clarifies that postpurchase affirmations can bind the seller,
regardless of whether the buyer provides additional consideration. 5 Hodaszy
states:
[Murray's] argument... is essentially that the rules with respect to
postformation-warranty modifications that comment 7 sets forth are
universalized under section 2-313 to provide that reliance is never
necessary for the creation of express warranties. This is a flawed reading
of section 2-313. Murray reads comment 7 as setting forth a rule to apply
in all cases, rather than only in the case of postformation warranties. Yet
it is much more plausible to read comment 7 as an exception to the general
rule set forth by section 2-313 rather than as a statement of that rule
56
itself.
Hodaszy seems correct in suggesting that the Code's drafters intended to
lay the pre-existing duty rule to rest in comment 7. The question, however,
is whether they had any other intentions. If they wanted only to address the
pre-existing duty rule, what is the reader to conclude from the language in the
first two sentences in comment 7 that have much broader implications? 7
These two sentences indicate that the precise time of warranty formation is not
material and that "[tihe sole question is whether the language or samples or
models are fairly to be regarded as part of the contract. "58 The comments
go beyond what is needed to reiterate section 2-209's abolition of the preexisting duty rule, seemingly expanding the notion of how and when an
express warranty is created. Whether the comments validate Murray's point
that the notion of bargain has been given a radically new meaning is not clear.
However, they appear to establish a broad principle regarding the formation
time of an express warranty.
Further, comment 4, which states in part that "the whole purpose of the
law of warranty is to determine what it is that the seller has in essence agreed
to sell . .. , 9 buttresses Murray's contention that the U.C.C. offers a new

the reward. See Denney v. Reppert, 432 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968).
55. See Hodaszy, supra note 3, at 491.
56. Id. at 506. Hodaszy also notes that comment 7 makes specific reference to section 2-209,
which provides for modifications of existing contracts without additional consideration. He views
this section as confirming the Code's emphasis on abolishing the pre-existingduty rule rather than
on carving out a new approach to the concept of bargains. Id. at 506-07.

57. See U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 7 (1987).
58. Id.

59. U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 4 (1987). The first paragraph of comment 4 states in full:
In view of the principle that the whole purpose of the law of warranty is to
determine what it is that the seller has in essence agreed to sell, the policy is adopted
of those cases which refuse except in unusual circumstances to recognize a material
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss3/3

14

Last Best Argument
Eliminating
from Express Warr
WARRANTIES
EXPRESS Reliance
RELIANCEforON
ELIMINATING
1994] Adler: The

approach to bargains. If the focus is on what the seller has agreed to sell
rather than on what the buyer has agreed to buy, then reliance becomes
irrelevant, and the main job in analyzing an express warranty claim is
determining what responsibility the seller has undertaken. Professor Lewis,
using comment 4 as authority, insists that the Code should be read as
establishing "strict claim liability;" that one who makes a representation must
stand behind it whether a claimant was aware of or relied on it.' Thus,
"when a representation about a product is made in a media available to any
consumer, that representation becomes a part of the basis of the bargain for
all consumers since it describes what it is the seller intends to sell."61
Comment 8 also contains language that is relevant to the reliance versus
no reliance debate. This comment addresses the question of what is included
as part of the basis of the bargain:
Concerning affirmations of value or a seller's opinion or commendation under subsection (2), the basic question remains the same: What
statements of the seller have in the circumstances and in objective
judgment become part of the basis of the bargain? As indicated above, all
of the statements of the seller do so unless good reason is shown to the
contrary. The provisions of subsection (2) are included, however, since
common experience discloses that some statements or predictions cannot
fairly be viewed as entering into the bargain.62
This comment, as with comments 3 and 7, comes tantalizingly close to
indicating whether reliance is necessary for a seller's representation to become
part of the basis of the bargain, but ultimately fails to resolve the point.
Comment 8 states that the seller's affirmations become part of the basis of the
bargain "unless good reason is shown to the contrary."6 Is good reason
shown when the seller demonstrates a lack of reliance by the buyer?
Unfortunately, neither section 2-313 nor comment 8 answers this question.
The reference in the comment to statements or predictions that "cannot fairly
be viewed as entering into the bargain" ' as set forth in section 2-313(2)
merely establishes that puffing, or enthusiastic sales talk containing neither

deletion of the seller's obligation. Thus, a contract is normally a contract for a sale
of something describable and described. A clause generally disclaiming "all
warranties, express or implied" cannot reduce the seller's obligation with respect to
such description and therefore cannot be given literal effect under Section 2-316.

Id.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

See Lewis, supranote 3, at 692.
Id.
U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 8 (1987).
Id.
Id.
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affirmations of fact nor promises, 6' does not constitute an express warranty.
The more critical issue, however, is whether language that would create an
express warranty fails to do so if the buyer does not rely on the language.
Comment 8, as with the other comments, does not answer that question.
In short, despite vigorous argument to the contrary by a number of
respected commentators, a careful review of section 2-313's legislative history,
language, and comments does not definitively answer whether reliance remains
a basic element of an express warranty.
III. THE COURTS' INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 2-313

Although confusion remains regarding the U.C.C. drafters' purpose in
adopting the basis of the bargain language, some relaxation of the reliance
requirement under the Uniform Sales Act was intended.' How courts have
decided express warranty cases under the U.C.C. and whether their decisions
have reduced the perceived unfairness of earlier rulings presents another issue.
A significant number of courts have ruled on the issue of reliance under
section 2-313. The majority have interpreted the section as requiring reliance
in some form. 67 Most do so in a fairly cursory fashion, stating merely that

65. In the words of subsection (2), "an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a
statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods does not
create a warranty." U.C.C. § 2-313(2) (1987). The line between puffing and express warranties
is not bright. See WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 9-4, at 394 (stating that "anyone who says
he can consistently tell a 'puff' from a warranty may be a fool or a liar").
66. As previously noted, Professor Williston, who wrote section 12 of the Uniform Sales Act,
criticized the courts' requirements for reliance in express warranties. See supra notes 19-21 and
accompanying text.
67. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 567 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating
that "we believe that the New Jersey Supreme Court would hold that a plaintiff effectuates the
'basis of the bargain' requirement of section 2-313 by proving that she read, heard, saw or knew
of the advertisement containing the affirmation of fact or promise"), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part on other grounds, 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992); Hobco, Inc. v. Tallahassee Assocs., 807 F.2d
1529, 1533 (11th Cir. 1987) ("Under Florida law, an express warranty may arise only where
justifiable reliance upon assertions or affirmations is part of the basis of the bargain."); General
Foods Corp. v. Valley Lea Dairies, Inc., 771 F.2d 1093, 1099 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that there
was no prejudicial error in.the instruction that knowledge, experience, and reliance by a buyer
are proper considerations in determining whether the seller created an express warranty); Royal
Typewriter Co. v. Xerographic Supplies Corp., 719 F.2d 1092, 1101 (11th Cir. 1983) (stating
that "absence of reliance will negate the existence ofan express warranty"); Overstreet v. Norden
Lab., Inc., 669 F.2d 1286, 1291 (6th Cir. 1982) (stating, "A warranty is the basis of the bargain
if it has been relied upon as one of the inducements for purchasing the product.") (citing KY.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 355.2-313(1)(a) cmt. I(C) (Baldwin 19); Van DurenHardware Co. V. John
H. Presha& Sons, 5 S.W.2d 1052 (Ky. Ct. App. 1928); Note, The Uniform Cormnercial Code
and Greater Consumer Protection Under Warranty Law, 49 Ky. L.J. 240 (1960)); Speed
Fasteners, Inc. v. Newsom, 382 F.2d 395, 397 (10th Cir. 1967) (finding that in a sale of stud
fasteners, no express warranty was created because the buyer did not rely on "any statement in
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the phrase "part of the basis of the bargain" has not abolished reliance.
Others indicate that the phrase, although carrying a reliance requirement,
imposes a more relaxed notion of reliance. 8

the [seller's] pamphlet, any promise, or any descriptionof the product"); Global Truck & Equip.
Co. v. Palmer Mach. Works, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 641, 652 (N.D. Miss. 1986) (concluding that
the buyer failed to prove the buyer relied on statements in the seller's brochure prior to or
contemporaneously with making the contract and could not recover for breach of express
warranty); Sessa v. Riegle, 427 F. Supp. 760, 766 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (stating that the "part of the
basis of the bargain" requirement is "essentially a reliance requirement"), aft'd, 568 F.2d 770
(3d Cir. 1978); Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676, 680 (D.N.H. 1972)
(finding that no warranty was created in sale of a hammer when the buyer did not rely on
statements contained in the seller's catalogue); Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Alter, 834 S.W.2d 136, 14647 (Ark. 1992) (finding that Ciba-Geigy's advertising materials contained an express warranty
for an herbicide that would have entitled the farmer to damages had he seen and relied on the
warranty and that, because buyer was "not influenced by the advertising materials when
purchasing [the herbicide], . . . they were not a basis of the bargain."); Thursby v. Reynolds
Metals Co., 466 So.2d 245, 250 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (finding that the buyer must
justifiably rely as part of basis of bargain) (citing Escombia Chem. Corp. v. Industrial-Marine
Supply Co., 223 So.2d 773 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969)); Keating v. DeArment, 193 So.2d 694
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App., cert. denied, 201 So.2d 230 (Fla. 1967)); Coryell v. Lombard LincolnApp. Ct. 1989) (holding that "the buyer must
Mercury, Merkur, 544 N.E.2d 1154, 1158 (Ill.
show reliance on the seller's representations in order for an express warranty to exist") (citing
App. Ct. 1976)); Cuthbertson v. Clark Equip.
Hrosik v. J. Keim Builders, 345 N.E.2d 514 (I11.
Co., 448 A.2d 315, 321 (Me. 1982) (finding no evidence of reliance and thus no express
warranty when the buyer could not show having seen the owner's manual prior to the sale);
Interco, Inc. v. Randustrial Corp., 533 S.W.2d 257, 262 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that a
catalogue, advertisement, or brochure can constitute an express warranty, but "must have at least
been read as the U.C.C. requires the proposed express warranty be part of the basis of the
bargain") (citing Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc. v. Talley, 493 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973));
Wendt v. Beardmore Suburban Chevrolet, 366 N.W.2d 424, 428 (Neb. 1985) (holding that the
buyer must prove reliance on express warranty to make it part of the basis of the bargain);
Scaringe v. Holstein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 903, 904 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (finding that the buyer
failed to show reliance on the seller's assurances that a used car was in excellent condition);
Thomas v. Amway Corp., 488 A.2d 716, 720 (R.I. 1985) (finding no express warranty in a sale
of liquid soap when the buyer did not show reliance on statements printed on the bottle); IndustRi-Chein Lab., Inc. v. Par-Pak Co., 602 S.W.2d 282, 293 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980) (stating,
"Obviously, if the buyer knows that a representation of the seller is untrue, that representation
cannot be a part of the basis of the bargain."); General Supply & Equip. Co. v. Phillips, 490
S.W.2d 913, 917 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972) (stating that to recover the injured party must show
reliance "on the representations, affirmations of facts or promises").
68. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541,568 (3d Cir. 1990) ("We hold
that once the buyer has become aware of the affirmation of fact or promise, the statements are
presumed to be part of the 'basis of the bargain' unless the defendant, by 'clear affirmative
proof,' shows that the buyer knew that-the affirmation of fact or promise was untrue."), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part on othergrounds, 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992); Sessa v. Riegle, 427 F. Supp.
760, 766 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (concluding that, although the Code retains reliance as a requirement
in express warranties, it does not require a "strong showing of reliance"), aft'd, 568 F.2d 770
(3d Cir. 1978); Ewers v. Eisenkopf, 276 N.W.2d 802, 805 (Wis. 1979) (stating, "The statutory
language 'a basisof the bargain' does not require the affirmation to be the sole basis for the sale,
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For those persons who favor retaining reliance, Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc. 69 provides a recent and comprehensive judicial analysis. In
Cippolone the husband of a deceased smoker brought a product liability action
on behalf of himself and his wife's estate against a tobacco manufacturer. The
plaintiff contended that a number of Liggett's ads represented its cigarettes as

safe, 70 creating an express warranty under section 2-313 of the U.C.C.. In

response Liggett argued that it should be permitted to show that Mrs.
Cipollone never relied on the representations." In its early opinion, the
district court "suggested that reliance by a buyer was presumed by the fact of
the making of the affirmation or promise but that the warrantor could rebut
this presumption." 72 Upon reconsideration, however, the court concluded
that reliance was irrelevant to a determination of whether a statement becomes
part of the basis of the bargain.7 3 On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed and
upheld the requirement that reliance be demonstrated. 74 In reaching its

only that it is afactor in the purchase.").
69. 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990).
70. Among the claims plaintiffs alleged constituted warranties under section 2-313 were
several ads on the Arthur Godfrey Show. Godfrey, a nationally known radio and television
personality, served as a spokesman for Chesterfield cigarettes for many years. In one typical ad,
Mr. Godfrey asserted:
[I have] a client here, the Chesterfield people, Liggett and Myers are their
names. mhe firm... is an honorable one, a trustworthy one. For years and years
and years that they have been advertising, you never heard them make an unsubstantiated claim-ever! Certainly not during the time that I've been with 'em. They came
out, not so long ago, with a report by an eminent physician-it's a good report-I
suppose there are those who wonder about it.
If you believe in me, and over the 23 years I've been in the radio, you know that
I have never yet misled you with advertising. Nobody has been able to buy me
enough to do that. If you believe in me, then you take my word that I know
this-that the Liggett and Myers people don't make statements that they can't
substantiate. And when they say that after this test that they made with the doctor,
that after he made it, he comes up and say [sic], quote- 'It is my opinion that the
ears, nose, throat, and accessory organs of all participating subjects examined by me,
were not adversely affected in the six-months period by smoking the cigarettes
provided.'
And they mean what they say-that specialist said it. Liggett and Myers have
substantiated it. Remember that when you're wondering about cigarettes. Smoke
Chesterfields-they're good.
Id. at 550 n.2 (alteration in original).
71. Id. at 563.
72. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 208, 213 (D.N.J.) (citing Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 1987 (D.N.J. 1988)), aff'd in part and reversed in part, 893
F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990)), aff'd in part and reversed in part on other grounds, 112 S.Ct. 2608
(1991).
73. Id.
74. Cipollone, 893 F.2d at 567.
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conclusion, the Third Circuit conceded that the legislative history of section
2-313 is unclear with respect to reliance75 and that the section's comments
appear inconsistent on the point.76

Notwithstanding these "seemingly inconsistent mandates on the reliance
question,"77 the court ruled that reliance was required, stating:
We believe that the most reasonable construction of section 2-313 is
neither Liggett's reliance theory, which fails to explain how reliance can
be relevant to "what a seller agreed to sell," or the district court's purely
objective theory, which fails to explain how an advertisement that a buyer
never even saw becomes part of the "basis of the bargain." Instead, we
believe that the New Jersey Supreme Court would hold that a plaintiff
effectuates the "basis of the bargain" requirement of section 2-313 by

proving that she read, heard, saw or knew of the advertisement containing
We hold that once the buyer has
the affirmation of fact or promise ....
become aware of the affirmation of fact or promise, the statements are
presumed to be part of the "basis of the bargain" unless the defendant, by
"clear affirmative proof," shows that the buyer knew that the affirmation
of fact or promise was untrue.78

The argument that seemed to persuade the court is similar to the argument
that convinced White and Summers the reliance requirement was necessary.
That is, it seems wrong to permit a buyer who had no knowledge of a seller's
statement about the product at the time of purchase (or shortly thereafter) to
recover simply because the buyer later discovered that the statement was
false. 79 The Third Circuit's approach reflects the majority view of section
75. Id. at 565 (acknowledging, "The history of section2-313(1)(a), although informative, fails
to give a clear answer as to whether reliance is required.").
76. The court read comment 3 as supporting the need for reliance, stating: "Inother words,
even though 'no particular reliance need be shown,' the seller can 'take [an] affirmation ...out
of the agreement' by showing that the buyer did not rely." Id. at 566 (alteration in original).
On the other hand, the court concluded that comment 7 presented substantial difficulties to
those who read section 2-313 as requiring reliance:
The reliance requirement does not comport well with U.C.C. Official Comment
7 to section 2-313.. . . If a post-closing promise-on which, by definition, a seller
cannot rely in deciding to make a purchase-can create a warranty, then it is difficult
to see why a pre-closing promise can create a warranty only if relied upon.
Id. at 567. Comment 4 also perplexed the court.
Additionally, a reliance requirement seems inconsistent with U.C.C. Official
Comment 4 to section 2-313. Comment 4 states that "the whole purpose of the law
of warranty is to determine what it is that the seller has in essence agreed to sell."
Reliance is irrelevant to what a seller agrees to sell.
Id. (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-313 U.C.C. cmt. 4 (West 1962)).
77. Id.
78. 893 F.2d at 567-68 (footnotes omitted).
79. See 893 F.2d at 567; see also WHiTE & SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 9-5, at 403 (stating
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2-313. The court apparently felt that its ruling occupied the middle ground
and that it reasonably accommodated the legitimate interests of both buyer and
seller. However, the ruling actually favors the seller. This point is most
obvious when one examines cases in which a seller has clearly used words that
would constitute an express warranty, but where the buyer cannot demonstrate
having seen them.
For example, in Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Alter' the seller distributed
advertising materials to farmers that stated, among other things, "'Crop
injury? You don't have to worry when you use Dual. Gives you peace of
mind. That's worth alot [sic]."'' The Arkansas Supreme Court, on appeal
from a $100,000 verdict in the buyer's favor, reversed and remanded.'
Addressing the buyer's express warranty claim, the court concluded that the
advertising materials distributed to farmers by Ciba-Geigy contained an
express warranty that a farmer need not worry about crop injury when using
Dual. Nevertheless, the court ruled that the plaintiff could not base a claim
on the warranty in the ads because he could not recall reading the advertising
materials.83 Although the court did leave the plaintiff with a possible
warranty claim based on oral representations made to him by the defendant's
salesman,84 proving the specifics of an oral warranty obviously presents a
more daunting task for the plaintiff than establishing the contents of a written
ad.
Barring consumers from pursuing a warranty claim because they cannot
specifically remember having seen the warranty produces two adverse effects.
First, this approach will prevent buyers who relied on representations in ads
from recovering if, after time has elapsed between the sale and the breach,
they cannot remember whether they read and relied on the advertisement.

the argument: "Why should one who has not relied on the seller's statement have the right to
sue?"). Other commentators have made powerful and persuasive responses to this question. See
infra notes 161-66 and accompanying text.
80. 834 S.W.2d 136 (Ark. 1992).
81. Id. at 138.
82. The issue leading to reversal was the trial court's failure to bifurcate the trial, separating
a settlement contract claim from other claims. Id. at 138.
83. According to the court:
The advertising materials distributed to farmers by Ciba-Geigy contained an
express warranty that a farmer need not worry about crop injury when using Dual.
Alter, however, did not recall reading any of the advertising materials. An
affirmation of fact must be part of the basis of the parties [sic] bargain to be an
express warranty. When a buyer is not influenced by the statement in making his or
her purchase, the statement is not a basis of the bargain. Clearly, Alter was not
influenced by the advertising materials when purchasing Dual, and hence they were
not a basis of the bargain.
Id. at 146-47 (citing Currier v. Spencer, 772 S.W.2d 309 (Ark. 1989)) (citation omitted).
84. Id. at 147.
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Second, this approach will encourage perjury by litigants, which undermines
the integrity of the judicial system. Ciba-Geigy, having placed these warranty
words in ads to sell its product and having represented that the product would
not cause harm, could use this ruling to challenge every claim based on its
representations by insisting that the claimants prove they relied on the ads
when purchasing Ciba-Geigy's product. In effect the company could gain the
benefits of extra sales induced by its ads while avoiding the consequences of
having to live up to the ads.
In Schmaltz v. Nissen85 the Supreme Court of South Dakota reversed a
lower court ruling that a statement on a seed bag, which said: "'This quality
seed is protected by Heptachlor insecticide treatment to help ensure stronger
stands, superior quality and increased yields,'"8 6 constituted an express
warranty upon which a claim could be pursued. According to the court:
In this case the trial court need not determine whether the language on
the seed bags constitutes an express warranty, since it is clear that such
language did not in any way become the basis of the bargain. Both
[plaintiffs] admit that they purchased the seed prior to seeing the bag
containing the seed. Neither read the language supposedly creating the
express warranty until after the sale was completed. Without having read
or even known of this language, it is impossible to say this language was
part of the basis of the bargain.8 7
Although the court affirmed the claim against the seed company on an
implied, warranty theory, 88 the ruling is unsatisfactory. Had the seller
successfully disclaimed all implied warranties, the buyers would have been left
without an effective remedy despite the words the seller placed on its seed
bag.
In Dilenno v. Libbey Glass Division" an injured consumer sued a jar
manufacturer for injuries sustained to her right hand when an allegedly
defective jar shattered as she attempted to replace its lid. The plaintiff claimed
that a catalogue containing an illustration showing that the jar would open and
close properly constituted an express warranty. 90 The court rejected her
claim, stating:
It is clear that a successful action for breach of an expressed warranty may
not be maintained in Delaware absent some reliance by the buyer on the

85. 431 N.W.2d 657 (S.D. 1988).

86. Id. at 659.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 661.
See id. at 661.
668 F. Supp. 373 (D. Del. 1987).
See id. at 376.
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warranty. There is no evidence in the record to suggest that [the plaintiff]
ever saw the Owens-Illinois catalog let alone relied on it when she
purchased the jar. Absent such evidence, [the plaintiff's] claim for breach
of an expressed warranty must fail. 91
It is doubtful that the court would have imposed liability even if it had
found that the illustration constituted an express warranty and even if it had
not insisted on a demonstration of reliance by the buyer. The court was
persuaded by evidence that the damage to the jar was as likely to have resulted
from misuse of the jar by the plaintiff or her customers as by any defect in the
product.' Nevertheless, the plaintiff would have been denied recovery even
if she could clearly demonstrate a breach of warranty because she was unable
to show reliance.
In Thomas v. Amway Corp.'3 a consumer who suffered a persistent,
severe rash for over a year after using the defendant's liquid soap claimed that
a label on the product stating "leaves skin feeling silky clean . . .Gentle for
all uses" constituted an express warranty.94 The court, insisting that these
words did not constitute a warranty and that she did not rely on them,
dismissed her claim. The court noted:
The plaintiff who claims breach of express warranty has the burden of
proving that the statements or representations made by the seller induced
her to purchase that product and that she relied upon such statements or
representations. In the case at bar, defendant had not printed on the bottle
that the product would not produce a rash, thus plaintiff had no representation to rely upon. As the trial justice properly noted, "there is no evidence
in this case that Mrs. Thomas made her bargain on anything contained on
the container." [sic] Without this evidence, we affirm the trial justice's
95
decision that plaintiff cannot recover for breach of express warranty.
The court's analysis seems unusually shallow. To rule that a serious
rash 96 does not constitute a breach of a representation that a soap is gentle for
all uses because the representation fails to provide that the soap would not
cause a rash is unconscionable.
Moreover, to insist that the plaintiff
demonstrate that the representations induced her to buy the product is to return

91. Id. at 376 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2-313 cmt. 1 (1974)).
92. See id. at 379.
93. 488 A.2d 716 (R.I. 1985).
94. Id. at 720.
95. Id. (alteration in original) (citing Alan Wood Steel Co. v. Capital Equip. Enters., 349
N.E.2d 627 (IlI. App. Ct. 1976); Rogers v. Zielinski, 209 A.2d 706 (R.I. 1965)).
96. The plaintiff contended that, shortly after using defendant's soap, she developed irritated
and inflamed skin with large red blotches that would often bleed, causing her clothes and bed
sheets to stick to her body-a painful condition that persisted for over a year. Id. at 718.
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to the pre-U.C.C. approach of the Uniform Sales Act so condemned by
98
Williston9 and to ignore the real-life buying patterns of consumers.
In Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools Corp.99 a worker who was partially
blinded when a hammer chip hit his eye based an express warranty claim on
language in defendant's catalogue that the hammer was "'[e]xcellent for the
repair work since it has plenty of 'beef' to handle heavy tires. Also can be
used for many -other jobs such as straightening frames, bumper brackets,
bumpers, puller work, etc.'" 1" The catalogue also stated, "'Federal Specs:
GGG-H-86A applies to the BH-123 Hammer.'"101 Despite evidence that the
plaintiff received the catalogue and that the hammer failed to meet the federal
specifications described in the catalogue, the court ruled that the plaintiff could
not maintain an express warranty claim, reasoning:
In order to find an express warranty, it must be shown that the representations of fact describing the hammer were made "part of the basis of the
bargain." In other words, plaintiff has the burden of showing that he acted
on the basis of the representations. There was evidence that plaintiff
received the 1969 Snap-On Catalogue, but no evidence that he relied on
the Catalogue description when he purchased the hammer. I rule,
plaintiff is not entitled to recover for breach of an express
therefore, that
2
warranty. 1
The court did uphold a verdict based on strict tort liability. However, the
plaintiff's recovery was reduced by twenty percent because the plaintiff was
contributorily negligent. 13 This reduction in damages might not have
occurred if the express warranty claim had been upheld. 04
Although some of the cases that require reliance permit the plaintiff to
97. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (stating Williston's view).
98. See, e.g., Lord, supra note 5, at 529. Lord argues that the problem with insisting that
a particular representation be the inducing factor that led to a purchase is that this view ignores
the fact that most bargains are based on "multiple, rather than single, factors." Id.
Buyers typically do not purchase solely on the basis of one or even several factors;
neither do they distinguish among the myriad of assertions which accompany most
sales, so that it is impossible to accurately determine whether a particular assertion
was "basic," "important," "meaningful," "useful," or "ignored." Rather, buyers buy
on the basis of an overall impression, and to the extent that any assertion by a seller
contributes to that overall impression, the buyer ought to be able to expect that the
asserted qualities will exist.
Id. See also infra notes 152-60 and accompanying text.
99. 339 F. Supp. 676 (D.N.H. 1972).
100. Id. at 677 (alteration in original).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 680 (citing Speed Fasteners, Inc. v. Newsom, 382 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1967)).
103. See id. at 680-85.
104. Professor Heckman finds this point disturbing. See Heckman, supra note 5, at 30-31.
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recover on an alternative theory, such as implied warranty or strict liability,
these cases carry the potential for manifest unfairness. By requiring the
plaintiff to demonstrate reliance on representations contained in an ad or on
a label when purchasing a product, the courts create an opportunity for
companies to attract numerous purchasers through extravagant claims, yet to
avoid liability for these claims because consumers cannot remember whether
they saw the claims prior to purchasing the product. Shifting the burden to the
defendant to demonstrate nonreliance, as Cipollone and other courts suggest,
hardly solves the problem. 05
Most courts continue to require reliance under section 2-313. Nevertheless, some claim to have discarded the requirement. 106 Not every court that
makes this claim does so to the same extent. Some courts, for example, still
7
require reliance, but shift the burden of proof to the defendant seller.°

105. Because most consumers do not read warranties until after they have purchased the
product, defendants will often find it easy to meet this burden of proof. See, e.g., infra notes
127-53 and accompanying text.
106. See, e.g. Lutz Farms v. Asgrow Seed Co., 948 F.2d 638, 644 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding
that a buyer who relied on his history of purchasing seed and not on the seller's promotional
literature could sue for breach of warranty based on promotional literature); Winston Indus. v.
Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 317 So.2d 493, 497 (Ala. Civ. App.) (finding that § 2-313 does not contain
reliance requirements), cert. denied, 317 So.2d 500 (Ala. 1975); Keith v. Buchanan, 220 Cal.
Rptr. 392, 394 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding that "actual reliance on the seller's factual representation
need not be shown by the buyer");,Jensen v. Seigel Mobile Homes Group, 668 P.2d 65, 71
(Idaho 1983) (stating that "the buyer of goods need not rely on an 'affirmation of fact or promise'
or 'description' for the same to become 'part of the basis of the bargain' and hence an express
warranty") (citing Autzen v. John C. Taylor Lumber Sales, 572 P.2d 1322 (Or. 1977)); Young
& Cooper, Inc. v. Vestring, 521 P.2d 281, 291 (Kan. 1974) (stating that "particular reliance
upon the express warranty need not be shown"); Interco Inc. v. Randustrial Corp., 533 S.W.2d
257, 261 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (stating that the U.C.C.'s adoption abandoned the old concept of
reliance) (citing Mo. Rev. Stat. § 400.2-313 U.C.C. cmt. 3 (1965)); Hawkins Constr. Co. v.
Matthews Co., 209 N.W.2d 643, 655 (Neb. 1973), overruled on other groundsas recognizedby
Murphy v. Selts-SchultzLumber Co., 481 N.W.2d 422 (Neb. 1992); Gladden v. Cadillac Motor
Car Div., 416 A.2d 394, 396 (N.J. 1980) (stating, "Particular reliance on such statements of
description or quality need not be shown. . . ." (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-313 U.C.C.
cmt. 3 (West 1962)); Perfetti v. McGhan Medical, 662 P.2d 646, 652 (N.M. Ct. App.) (stating
that no independent showing of reliance is required on an affirmation of fact that is the basis of
the bargain), cert. denied, 662 P.2d 645 (1983); Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 218 N.E.2d
185, 192 (Ohio 1966); Villalon v. Vollmering, 676 S.W.2d 220, 222 n.1 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984)
(stating that the buyer's reliance is not a proper element for recovery on an express warranty)
(citing Indust-Ri-Chem. Lab., Inc. v. Par-Pak Co., 602 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980));
Elanco Prods. Co. v. Akin-Tunnell, 474 S.W.2d 789, 793 n.4 (Tex. Ct. App. 1971) (stating that
buyer reliance "is not a determinative element under the Code") (quoting Editor's Note, 2
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 916 (Callaghan 1965)).
107. See, e.g. Royal Typewriter Co. v. Xerographic Supplies Corp., 719 F.2d 1092, 1101
(11th Cir. 1983); (quoting Royal Business Mach. v. Lorraine Corp., 633 F.2d 34, 44 n.7 (7th
Cir. 1980)); Royal Business Mach., 633 F.2d at 44 n.7 (quoting Sessa v. Riegle, 427 F. Supp.
760, 766 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aft'd, 568 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1978)); Sessa, 427 F. Supp. at 766.
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Others announce in unequivocal terms that reliance is no longer required, but
then demand some proof that the buyer knew of and considered the representations constituting the warranty in making their purchase.'0 8
Some courts, however, appear to have abandoned reliance. InLutz Farms
v. Asgrow Seed Co.," 9 buyers of onion seed that produced unmarketable
double onions brought an action against the seller on a variety of theories,
including breach of express warranty. The plaintiff based the express
warranty claim on representations about the quality of the seed contained in
the seller's promotional publications. Despite the buyer's testimony that he
relied on favorable past experience with the seed rather than on the seller's
brochures, the court upheld the express warranty claims. In doing so, the
court noted: "It appears that the majority of jurisdictions which have addressed
the issue have found it unnecessary to require reliance from the buyer before
a statement by the seller can be considered an express warranty."110 While
this statement is factually incorrect, the court's ruling appears to be correct.
A company that represents that the quality of its product meets certain
standards should not be able to avoid liability simply because the purchaser
honestly-and, from hindsight, naively-admitted that his past experience with
the product, and not statements in brochures, motivated him to buy it.
In Daughtrey v. Ashe"' the buyer purchased a diamond bracelet for his
wife from the defendant. After the buyer agreed to purchase the bracelet and
paid the defendant, the defendant's business associate placed the bracelet,
together with an appraisal form, in a box and handed the box to the buyer.
The appraisal stated that the diamonds were of "v.v.s. quality," which is "one
In
of the highest ratings in a [gem] quality classification system ... ."1
fact, the diamonds were of substantially lower quality than v.v.s.. Upon
discovering this, the buyer sued. The lower court denied recovery on the
the purchaser had
basis of an express warranty because, among other reasons,
113
not relied on the appraisal when purchasing the bracelet.
The Virginia Supreme Court reversed, holding that the representation of
v.v.s. quality did constitute an express warranty upon which a claim could be
based."' Although the buyer probably did not see the appraisal form until
after the sale's completion, the court held that the representation about v.v.s.

108. See, e.g., Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Laird, 432 So. 2d 1259, 1261 (Ala. 1983); Keith v.
Buchanan, 220 Cal. Rptr. 392, 397-98 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Interco, Inc. v Randustrial Corp.,
533 S.W.2d 257, 261-62 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Gladden v. Cadillac Motor Car Div., 416 A.2d
394, 396 (N.J. 1980).
109. 948 F.2d 638 (10th Cir. 1991).
110. Id. at 645.
111. 413 S.E.2d 336 (Va. 1992).
112. Id. at 337.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 338.
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quality constituted part of the basis of the bargain." 5 Rather than focusing
on what the purchaser knew at the time of purchase, the court focused on what
the seller represented, stating:
We conclude from the language used in Code [§ 2-313] and the
Official Comment thereto that the drafters of the Uniform Commercial
Code intended to modify the traditional requirement of buyer reliance on
express warranties....
[The defendant] introduced no evidence of any factor that would take
11 6
his affirmation of the quality of the diamonds out of the agreement.
This case assumes particular significance because it represents a typical
buying pattern that the courts and commentators often ignore in analyzing
reliance in express warranty cases. Most consumers do not read, and may not
even know about, the representations made by sellers until after the purchase
has been made. To insist that purchasers know of the representations prior to
purchase means that a substantial number of legitimate claims will be barred.
In Winston Industries v. Stuyvesant Insurance Co."' an insurer, as
subrogee of the insured, brought an action against the manufacturer of a
mobile home for breach of express warranty. At trial the purchaser testified
that he never received a copy of the warranty and did not know about a
warranty. He had received a bill of sale stating that the mobile home carried
a factory guarantee, but the bill provided no further details. Although the
purchaser did not receive and was unable to recall the existence of a warranty,
the court found that a warranty existed, reasoning:
As this court perceives it, the determining factor in this case under the
newly enacted Uniform Commercial Code is not reliance by the purchaser
on the seller's warranty, but whether it is part of the "basis of the
bargain."
In fact, it is not necessary to show any particular reliance by the buyer
to give rise to such warranties.
The question before us, in this instance, is whether the warranty is to
be regarded as part of the contract, to wit, whether it is part of the basis
of the bargain. Referring once again to the aforementioned bill of sale
which states that "new trailers bear usual factory guarantee," we find it is
indeed a basis of the bargain." 8

115. See id. at 339.
116. 413 S.E.2d at 339.
117. 317 So.2d 493 (Ala. Civ. App. 1975).
118. Id. at 497 (citing Young & Cooper, Inc. v. Vestring, 521 P.2d 281 (Kan. 1974); Hawkins
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One might ask whether the court would have ruled the same way if the
bill of sale had not mentioned the factory guarantee. There is no clear answer,
but it is hard to see why this condition should have changed the court's
opinion. Although the facts are murky on the point, nothing in the case
suggests that the purchaser noticed or relied on the bill of sale in making his
purchase. Therefore, if the mobile home dealer generally offered an express
warranty, whether the purchaser looked at the bill of sale at the time of the
sale or after the sale's completion should make no difference.
IV. RELIANCE AND CONSUMER BEHAVIOR
Courts and commentators who have wrestled with the issue of reliance
have generally done so with little knowledge of the real life implications of
their positions. They have simply analyzed legal issues in the abstract. In
theory, barring parties from claiming rights under a contract that they never
bargained for and never realized existed when entering the contract is logical.
The notion of "mutual assent" in contract law rests upon this assumption." 9
Unfortunately, both theoretical and practical problems plague any approach
that is too purist in applying this principle."2
Parties act in ways that bear little relation to the theory of mutual assent.
Real life buyers and sellers often ignore important contractual elements or fail
to draft agreements precisely. To accommodate such real world consumer
behavior, the U.C.C. has developed various approaches. The Code, for
example, provides rules to address circumstances when the parties fail to state
their intentions with respect to critical terms,"' hold conflicting notions
Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., 209 N.W.2d 643 (Neb. 1973); Elanco Prods. Co. v. AkinTunnell, 747 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Ct. App. 1971); 1 RONALD A. ANDERSON, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313:18 (2d ed. 1970)).
119. See, e.g., JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1987) § 2-1,
at 25 (stating, "Usually an essential prerequisite to the formation of a contract is an agreement:
a mutual manifestation of assent to the same terms.") (citing Russell v. Union Oil Co., 86 Cal.
Rptr. 424 (Ct. App. 1970); Quality Sheet Metal Co. v. Woods, 627 P.2d 1128 (Haw. Ct. App.
1981); Brown v. Considine, 310 N.W.2d 441 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (per curiam); Christenson
v. Billings Livestock Comm'n Co., 653 P.2d 492 (Mont. 1982); Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Mesilla
Valley Flying Serv., 462 P.2d 144 (N.M. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1076 (1970)).
120. To insist, for example, that only those elements of an agreement that a party actually
considered and accepted in his or her mind invites endless squabbling about to what the parties
have agreed. Because the courts cannot read the parties' true subjective intentions, the courts
have substituted an objective test for assessing contractual intent that focuses on what a party says
and does rather than on what the party actually thinks. If a party wishes to sell a green car, but
mistakenly states, "I offer to sell you my red car for $5,000," that party will be held to have
offered to sell the red car whatever the true intent if a reasonable person in the shoes of the
offeror would assume that this statement were a genuine offer to sell the red car. See id. at 74.
The objective test guarantees that, on occasion, the parties' real intentions will not be accorded
their true measure by the courts. Id.
121. If the parties truly intend to enter into a contract, but fail to spell out necessary terms, §
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about the agreement's terms,'2 overlook important obligations," or agree
to oppressive terms. 24 In all cases, the courts must construct or rearrange
the terms of a contract to address the fact that people do not act as carefully
or comprehensively as assumed by the theory of mutual assent. Substantial
unfairness and impracticality would plague the legal system if the Code rigidly
enforced the contract terms, including only the terms explicitly thought about
and agreed to by the parties.
That terms establishing an express warranty present concerns similar to
those in general contract formation is not surprising. Actual consumer
behavior is different from the behavior required by the reliance test, even from
a weak test that shifts the burden to defendants to demonstrate nonreliance.'I The vast majority of consumers who purchase products would
find themselves without legal recourse if sellers widely challenged buyers'
warranty claims. Fortunately, most sellers do not insist on verifying their
customers' reliance when they process warranty claims.126 Unfortunately,
sellers do invoke reliance to challenge buyers' warranty claims when the
financial stakes are highest and the need for warranty protection is greatest,
such as when severe personal injury, substantial property damage, or death is
involved.

2-204 of the U.C.C. provides that the contract will not fail for indefiniteness. See U.C.C. § 2204(3) (1987). The Code sets forth a variety of gap fillers establishing terms that prevail when
the parties neglect to include such terms in their contract. See, e.g., id. § 2-305(1) (providing
that if the parties have not set a price, "the price is a reasonable price at the time for delivery");
id. § 2-307 ("Unless agreed . . . otherwise all goods ... must be tendered in a single
delivery. . . ."); id. § 2-308(a) ("Unless otherwise agreed ... the place for delivery of goods
is the seller's place of business . . . ."); id. § 2-309(1) (stating, "The time for delivery or any
other action under a contract if not provided in this Article or agreed upon shall be a reasonable
time."); id. §2-310 ("Unless otherwise agreed ... payment is due at the time and place at which
the buyer is to receive the goods . .

").

122. When the parties have clearly expressed contractual intent, but the acceptance of an offer
carries either additional or different terms, § 2-207 of the U.C.C. provides a mechanism for
determining whether the terms are incorporated into the agreement. See U.C.C. § 2-207 (1987).
123. The U.C.C. establishes important obligations when the parties have been silent on terms.
For example, the Code imposes warranties of title, see id. § 2-312, merchantability, see id. § 2314, and fitness for a particular purpose, see id. § 2-315, on the parties by implication even
though neither party bargained for the warranties.
124. The U.C.C. gives the courts the authority to invalidate "unconscionable" contract terms
notwithstanding a party's agreement to them. See U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1987).
125. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 568 (3d Cir. 1990), aff'd in part and
reversed in parton other grounds, 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1991).
126. To maintain good customer relations, many sellers go far beyond what the law requires
with respect to servicing products and accepting returns. Consumers who are accustomed to large
retailers' providing refunds automatically when they return products would be surprised to learn
how limited their rights of rejection and revocation of acceptance truly are under the U.C.C. See
generally U.C.C. §§ 2-601 to 616 (1987).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss3/3

28

1994]

Adler: The Last Best Argument for Eliminating Reliance from Express Warr
ELIMINATING RELIANCE ON EXPRESS WARRANTIES

Equally unfortunate is the failure of the courts to understand the unfairly
proseller and anticonsumer nature of the reliance requirement. To appreciate
this inequality, one must look to how and when consumers rely on express
warranties.
First, one must note that most express warranties are not dickered over
in the sense that they arise from face to face discussions between seller and
buyer. Most express warranties are provided on printed forms inserted in
boxes or packages that are not opened until after completion of the sale and
delivery of the goods. If warranties are not provided in this form, then they
typically arise from affirmations or promises contained in advertising pitched
broadly to numerous potential customers.
One turns to data showing how consumers process these warranties. By
far, the most compelling evidence of consumer behavior with respect to
express warranties comes from studies published by the Federal Trade
Commission in 197927 and 1984." These studies, designed to assess the
impact of rules'2 9 promulgated under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal
Trade Commission Improvement Act,' 30 demonstrate convincingly that
consumers rarely look at or know about express warranties before purchasing
products. By implication, those courts that insist on reliance under section 2313 would bar redress to enormous numbers of consumers.
The 1979 FTC Study surveyed 3063 households"' to determine, among
other things, "Measures of warranty information usage by consumers,
including information on how consumers obtained such information, when they
obtained it, and how well they felt they understood the terms of warran-

127. ARTHUR YOUNG & CO., FTC, WARRANTIES RULES CONSUMER BASELINE STUDY (1979)

[hereinafter 1979 FTC STUDY].
128. FTC, OFFICE OF IMPACT EVALUATION, WARRANTIES RULES CONSUMER FOLLOW-Up:

EVALUATION STUDY (1984) [hereinafter 1984 FTC STUDY].
129. The FTC studied three rules promulgated under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal
Trade Commission Improvement Act. See infra note 124. Current versions of these rules are:
(a) Disclosure of Written Consumer Product Warranty Terms and Conditions, 16

C.F.R. § 701 (1993);
(b) Pre-Sale Availability of Written Warranty Terms 16 C.F.R. § 702 (1993); and
(c) Informal Dispute Settlement Procedures, 16 C.F.R. § 703 (1993).
130. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12 (1988).
131. The respondentuniverse for the... Study consisted of a randomly-selected
sample of 4,300 households drawn from an established national Consumer
Mail Panel (CMP) of 61,552 cooperating households. These households
[were] identical to the United States populationwith respectto characteristics
such as geographic regional totals of U.S. households in census regions,
income categories and age distributions. Additionally, for each household,
certain demographic information [was] known; examples include age and sex
of household members, education level of members and marital status ....
1979 FTC Study, supra note 127, at v. of the 4,300 CMP households, 3,063 responded, a 71.2%
response rate. Id.
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ties."132 Several responses to the survey illustrate the problem of requiring

reliance for express warranties.
When asked whether they thought a product had a warranty before
purchasing it, about eighty-four percent of the respondents answered
"yes."133 Although this percentage may seem reassuring, it is not particularly useful. First, the survey asks only whether, before making a purchase, the
respondents though the product carried a warranty, not whether the product

actually had a warranty.' 34 Second, because this study relies on consumer's

self-reporting, this result and others in the study probably inflate the actual
percentage because of consumers' overreporting. 13 5

132. Other measures included:
Measures of product purchase behavior, such as shopping time, brand consideration, awareness of warranty, knowledge of warranty details
Measures of warranty complaint-related behavior, such as frequency of product
problems, frequency of contacting individuals or organizations about product
problems, levels of satisfaction with the way in which product problems were
handled by warrantors
Measures of both product attributes and warranty attributes that consumers said
they valued most in considering the purchase of a product having a warranty
Measures of what consumers perceive warranty coverage to be on various
categories of products
Measures of how satisfied consumers said they were with how products
having warranties performed and how well consumers said they were
satisfied with the way their product complaints were handled
Measures of how warrantors behaved, as reported by consumers, with particular
emphasis on how long it took a warrantor to repair a product, how many repair
attempts were made, and so forth.
Id. at iii-iv.
133. Id. at 128.
134. It is doubtful that any court requiring reliance under § 2-313 would conclude that an
unsupported expectation of warranty protection provides sufficient evidence to support the
existence of a warranty.
135. As stated in the 1979 FTC study:
[One major source of] bias regarding consumer's recall of warranty provisions
stems from the possibility that consumers responding to this survey, in an effort to
portray themselves as informed, or "good" consumers, over-reported their levels of
warranty reading or warranty-related consumer complaint behavior. In fact,
consumers, to the extent that their product purchase behavior is represented by the
behavior of purchasers responding in this survey, may not have read warranties to the
extent reported in this Final Report. This problem will have to be recognized in any
future Warranties Rules Study in order to avoid "ceiling effects" emerging at the time
of that future study.
1979 FTC STUDY, supranote 127, at x.
Another source of potential bias results from the gap of eight to 20 months between the time
that respondent purchasers bought a product and the time that they reported on the product in the
survey.
Id. at ix.
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Of greater importance, when asked whether they knew any details of the
warranty before buying the product, 36 only 55.4% of the respondents
indicated knowing about the details of the warranty. 3 7 Moreover, only
28.4% of those who reported that they had a warranty indicated that they had
read it prior to purchase 38 even though 81.6% of the respondents indicated
that the warranty was available to read just before they made their purchase. 139
The 1984 FTC Study, 40 undertaken to determine whether the marketplace had changed after the FTC warranty rules had been in effect for roughly
six years, 41 provides no indication that consumers increased their prepurchase awareness of warranties. 42 Indeed, the 1984 results show a
decline in warranty awareness; the number of consumers claiming to have
some warranty information prior to purchasing a product dropped from fiftyfive percent to forty percent between 1979 and 1984. 41 Sixty percent of the
respondents had no warranty information prior to making their purchase.

Courts that insist on reliance will not grant warranty protection to consumers

136. Note that this question asks whether respondents knew any details. It does not ask which
details they knew and which details they did not know. Whether a limited knowledge of the
details of a warranty would satisfy the courts that insist on reliance under § 2-313 is unclear.
137. 1979 FTC STUDY, supra note 127, at 55. This, of course, means that 45 % knew no
details of their warranty when they purchased a product. Of those in the 1979 FTC Study who
claimed to know warranty details before purchasing a product, 48.7 percent indicated that they
learned them from a salesperson, Id. at 224. Unfortunately, salespeople are not always the best
sources of information.
138. Id. at 58.

139. Id. at 225. Section 702 requires that warranties be made available to consumers before
purchase. 16 C.F.R. § 702.3 (1993).
140. For the 1984 FTC Study, survey questionnaires were sent to 8691 Market Facts'
Consumer Mail Panel members. Of these, 6418 households (73.8%) responded. 1984 FTC
STUDY, supra note 128, at E.S.1.
141. Id.

142. According to the authors of the 1984 FTC Study:
While the questionnaires used in the baseline [1979 FTC Study] and follow-up
warranties rules studies are sufficiently different to rule out direct comparisons on
many important measures, it is probably fair to say that the two studies do not paint
radically different pictures of the marketplace. There is certainly no indication that
pre-purchase consumer knowledge about the details of warranties has increased since
the warranties rules went into effect.
Id. at 134.
143. Id. at 48. The 1979 FTC Study asked: "Did you know any of the details about the
warranty before you bought the product?" 1984 FTC STUDY, supra note 128, at48 n.17. Fiftyfive percent responded that they did. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. The 1984 FTC
Study asked: "Did you have any information about the warranty on this product before you
bought it?" 1984 FTC STUDY, supra note 128, at 48 n. 17. Although the questions were worded
similarly, the authors of the report indicated that some methodological problems in the first
survey make a close comparison of the two results risky. Id.
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who do not have at least some prepurchase information. Even the small
number of consumers claiming to have read a Warranty prior to purchasing a
product is undoubtedly inflated. 4 ' Respondents, apparently believing that
they should have read the warranty, indicated that they had even when they
45

had not. 1
The number of respondents who actually read the warranty prior to
purchase remained small in the 1984 survey. Only 23.1 % of those claiming

to have prepurchase warranty information obtained any information by reading
the warranty. 46 This figure obviously inflates the number of warranty
readers because it excludes those who did not indicate that they had pre-

purchase information.

A more realistic measure of prepurchase warranty

reading is a comparison of the total number of purchases of warranted
products (10,813) to the number of these purchases for which respondents
indicated they had read the warranties (980). 147 The result (9.1%) is

disturbingly small 4 8 and, as indicated, even this number is probably inflat49
ed. 1
One encouraging statistic is the number of respondents who claimed to
have read the warranty after purchasing the product. Of those who bought
products with warranties, nearly twice as many reported reading the warranty
carefully after buying the product (40.1%) than those who reported doing so
before (22%). 1 15 An additional 31.4% said they glanced briefly at the
warranty.' 5' Only 26.2% of the buyers reported that they had not read the

144. When comparing the results of several questions, the authors found a surprising number
of inconsistentresponses. Roughly 39% of the consumers who claimed, on the one hand, to have
read the warranty "carefully" before purchasing a product also claimed, on the other hand, to
have had no prior knowledge of the warranty. This discrepancy provoked some exasperation on
the part of the authors: "While it is possible that a brief look at the warranty was uninformative,
it is unreasonable to believe that 660 people carefully read warranties and learned absolutely
nothing. Yet, that is precisely what their responses indicate." Id. at 53. Equally frustrating was
the report by 54 respondents on one question that they had read the warranty prior to purchasing
a product but four questions later they reported not having read it. Id. at 55.
145. Id.
146. 1984 FTC STUDY, supra note 128, at 50. Respondents claimed that they obtained
warranty information from salespersons and newspaper or magazine articles more often than from
actually reading the warranty. Id. Again, the reliability of such sources is questionable.
147. See id. at 51-52.
148. One marketing expert succinctly explained that "one conclusion can be drawn from the
182 Survey results: in the post-Act marketplace, most purchases are not preceded by the reading
of a product's warranty." Joshua L. Weiner, An Evaluationof theMagnuson-Moss Warrantyand
FederalTrade Commission Improvement Act of 1975, 7 J. PUB. POL'Y & MKTG. 65, 69 (1988).
149. As pointed out in the study, "Even this number may be an overestimate of the actual
amount of warranty reading which takes place." 1984 FTC STUDY, supra note 128, at 52. See
also supra note 139 and accompanying text.
150. 1984 FTC SURVEY, supra note 128, at 67.
151. Id.
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warranty at all after making the purchase." 2 Unfortunately, the data on

post-purchase warranty reading do not indicate precisely when the respondents
looked at their warranties.

53

The legal implications of the FTC studies are ominous. If the courts
require, as a necessary element of reliance, buyers to have glanced at or read
the warranty prior to the sale, the vast majority of consumers will be barred
from making express warranty claims. Even under a lower reliance standard,1 4 a plaintiff must prove only that "she read, heard, saw or knew of
the ... affirmation of fact or promise" ' to preclude most warranty claims.
Under a reliance test, most consumers have faith and vague expectations
but no demonstrable basis for claiming warranty rights at the time they
purchase a product. As Professor Morris Shanker wryly observed, arguments

that insist on reliance
restrict express warranty protection to the most unlikely buyers; namely,
those precious few and rather odd persons who prior to a sale take the time
to read all the language on and within the packaging. The more typical
buyer-those who do not go through this unlikely exercise-are denied

express warranty protection.

56

Emerging knowledge about consumer behavior in response to modem
marketing techniques confirms that a reliance test is unrealistic. Marketers
spend millions of dollars to understand what motivates consumers to purchase
products. 5 1 Each year, without a clear idea of which advertising techniques
15 8
work, the top 100 advertisers spend roughly $35 billion on advertising.

Researchers know that "a complex combination of marketing factors interplay

152. Id.

153. Because the survey asked consumers to respond for purchases of up to three products
during the past 12 months, one and assume that all post-purchase warranty reading occurred
within a 12 month period after purchase. See id. at ES-1. One obvious question about
postpurchase warranty reading is whether comment 7 of § 2-313 would permit the buyer to claim
that representations contained in the warranty constitute a modification and thus are incorporated
as "part of the basis of the bargain." White and Summers would obviously oppose such claims.
See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 68-78 and accompanying text.
155. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 567 (3d Cir. 1990), rev'd in part on
other grounds, 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992) (footnote omitted).
156. Shanker, supranote 5, at 41.
157. Robert S. Adler & R. David Pittle, Cajoleryor Command: Are Education Campaignsan
Adequate Substitute for Regulation?, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 159, 163 (1984) (stating that
"[m]erchandising and marketing remain more art than science, more intuition than reason").
158. R. Craig Endicott, P&G Spends $2.28 Billion, Surges to Head of Top 100, 62
ADVERTISING AGE, September 25, 1991, at 1,1.
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with one another and result in a buying decision.""5 9 To insist that
consumers demonstrate that a particular representation or statement constituted
the primary factor, or even a minor factor, that led them to purchase a product
is unrealistic. Pinpointing a motivating factor for a purchase when the media
and nationwide advertising often appeal to subconscious and emotional needs
is impossible. 6 Whitman argues that most consumer purchases result from
numerous motivating factors, including friends and neighbors, brand loyalty,
reputation of seller, labels, marketing display, and distribution."' Accordingly, Whitman argues that courts "should permit a rebuttable presumption
that reliance on a representation exists unless proven otherwise by the defen6
dant."1 2
If nothing else, because mass media product promotion and advertising, as
opposed to direct contact with the seller, is responsible for most consumer
information, this type of information should be carefully scrutinized. To
the extent mass media advertising provides misleading information to the
public, we should bear in mind that such information might have a
subconscious effect on consumer behavior even though an injured
plaintiff
t63
cannot recall seeing or hearing the advertisement in question.
Another problem with advertising is that its role, although powerful, is
often indirect. For example, a representation in an ad that convinces an
opinion leader' 16 to purchase a product might lead many others to make the
same purchase with the others relying not on the ad but on the opinion leader.
None of those who followed their friend's or relative's lead, for example,
would have a claim under a reliance test. As one writer has noted, advertising
often does not have a direct effect on sales. 16 Instead, it generates word-ofmouth communications that trigger purchases.' t
Those seeking warranty
protection who have relied on word-of-mouth communications from one who

159. Whitman, supra note 3, at 742.
160. See generally VANCE PACKARD, THE HIDDEN PERSUADERS

(1957) (arguing that marketers use subtle signals to trigger emotional responses to motivate
consumers to purchase products).
161. Whitman, supranote 3, at 765.
162. Id. at 742.
163. See Whitman, supra note 3, at 743.
164. This term was first used in 1944 by a group of researchers analyzing voter decisionmaking during election campaigns. The researchers found that substantial numbers of voters in
deciding for whom to vote relied not on the claims of candidates in the mass media but rather on
the advice of certain people called opinion leaders who are most concerned and articulate about
an issue. PAUL F. LAZARSFELD ET AL., THE PEOPLE'S CHOICE 49-51 (1944).
165. Barry L. Bayus, Word of Mouth: The Indirect Effects of Marketing Efforts, J.
ADVERTISING RESEARCH, June/July 1985, at 31.
166. Id. at 37.
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saw an advertisement often have no idea that the recommendation stemmed
mainly from an affirmation or promise in the advertising. This problem
strongly suggests a need to retire traditional requirements for reliance.
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Decisionmakers must weigh many policy considerations in deciding how
to deal with reliance under § 2-313. On balance, the arguments favor
abandoning the reliance requirement.
A. Non-Reliance and the Right to Sue
White and Summers offer a succinct and compelling challenge to those
who advocate abandoning reliance: "Why should one who has not relied on
the seller's statement have the right to sue? Such a plaintiff is asking for
greater protection than he would get under the warranty of merchantability, far
more than he bargained for. We would send him to the implied warranties."167 Some unjust enrichment may occur when protection is provided to
a purchaser who never knew about that protection at the time of purchase.
Yet, there are a number of compelling answers to White and Summers'
argument.

Professor Murray responds that the two commentators fail to comprehend
the major changes wrought by the U.C.C. According to Murray, White and
Summers equate the reliance requirement with the notion of "bargained-forexchange" in general contract law. 16 This proposition, Murray asserts, is
wrong. 169 By giving effect to postformation express warranties in comment
7 of section 2-313, the drafters made clear that they intended something
broader.'1 0 What the drafters intended is a modem approach that looks

167. WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 3, at 403.
168. Murray states:
By insisting upon knowledge on the part of the buyer or his agent, [White's and
Summers's analysis] suggests that a buyer somehow must know of and "accept" a
seller's statement relating to the goods just as an offeree must know of and accept the
offer. White and Summers appear to base their insistence of a showing of reliance
on the notion that reliance is similar to the bargained-for-exchange idea, which
requires at least inducement reliance.
Murray, supra note 3, at 306.
169. Id.
170. Murray argues:
To properly understand Comment 7, one must realize that the U.C.C. describes an
expanded notion of basis of the bargain. The basis of the bargain is not limited to the
traditional law of contracts, nor is it restricted to situations involving inducement or
reliance. White and Summers further reveal their misunderstandingof these precepts
in the particularly narrow scope they give to postformation warranties.
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expansively at the contract between the parties and that does not freeze the
parties' agreement in time so that postformation warranties become unenforceable.171 Murray argues that a superior approach is a "reasonable expectations" test, stated: "What are the reasonable expectations of the buyer?" 72
Answering his own question, Murray explains that
The reasonable expectations of the buyer are not relegated to those induced
by the seller's promise. Nor are they relegated to those expectations
which the buyer also relied upon in making the purchase. Rather they are
those expectations created by all of the "affirmations of fact made by the
seller about the goods during a bargain. " "'
Furthermore, Murray states that
[A] buyer expects to receive . . . that which all other buyers, similarly
situated, receive as part of their deals for the identical product. It would
be quite difficult to convince buyers that they are not entitled to the
features they learn about some time, even a relatively long time, after the
contract is formed. It would be virtually impossible to convince buyers
that a seller who refuses to provide the features that the seller promised to
provide, albeit after the time of contract formation, is operating in good
faith and is not simply using technical arguments to avoid delivering "what
it is that the seller has in essence agreed to sell." 74
Murray's thesis has been both praised 75 and challenged. 76
Murray's reading involves some unnecessary vagueness in interpreting
section 2-313 since one must analyze when a consumer's expectations about
warranty coverage become reasonable and cease to be reasonable. Rather than
using this analysis, one should focus on whether the buyer fits within the class
of persons to whom the seller made representations or promises that constitute
express warranties. This question is easier to apply and more consistent with

Id. at 309.
171. Id. at 325.
172. Id. at 317.
173. Murray, supra note 3, at 304 (quoting § 2-313 cmt. 3).
174. Id. at 313 (quoting § 2-313 cmt. 4).
175. E.g., Heckman, supra note 5, at 35 ("[Murray's] conclusion, with which this Article
heartily agrees, is that the U.C.C. has rejected the reliance concept in favor of a more modem
approach which looks at the entire scope of dealings between the parties and does not focus on
any particular moment of contracting or reliance."); Coffey, supra note 3, at 122 (referring to
Murray's "excellent" article and stating: "As Murray suggests, the drafters were working with
a new concept of contract law, one that gave importance to every action and reaction of the
parties during the bargaining process.").
176. See, e.g., supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
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the language and spirit of section 2-313. The emphasis should be on the
person to whom the seller made a pitch and not whether the buyer reasonably
interpreted the seller's affirmations of fact.1"
Nevertheless, Murray's
willingness to read the U.C.C. as going beyond traditional doctrines seems
correct.
Heckman offers a different answer when White and Summers question
why one who has not relied on the seller's statement should have the right to
sue:

One can answer White and Summers's final rhetorical question with
another question: Why should a seller be permitted to deny the validity of
statements he has made in a sale context, whether or not the buyer has
relied on them at the time of78 negotiation? To do so surely does not
promote commercial honesty.1
Heckman's response to White and Summers is powerful. Denying recovery
to purchasers who cannot prove reliance ensures that sellers will be able to
misrepresent the features of their
products and yet often avoid the consequenc79
es. This result seems unfair. 1
White and Summers contend that permitting a buyer to recover on
promises or affirmations upon which he or she did not rely gives the buyer
greater protection than the buyer bargained for.'8 ° Their objection misses
the mark widely in light of what is known about modem marketing practices
and consumer behavior.'' Most consumers do not "bargain" in a face-toface setting nor do they even know many of the terms set forth in the contracts
they sign." If one were to apply White and Summer's analysis consistently, it would exclude large numbers of contractual rights that the two
commentators would likely want to keep. For example, to insist that a
purchaser "rely" on a contractual term before having the right to invoke it
means that he or she would lose the right to enforce the following terms: those
not read, those misunderstood, those not known, and those ignored by the
purchaser. It would also exclude terms known to the purchaser, but about
177. Under Murray's approach, those sellers who have made the most outrageous affirmations
of fact or promises escape liability if they convince a court that a reasonable purchaser would not
have believed their representations.
178. Heckman, supra note 5, at 28-29.
179. See supra notes 121-60 and accompanying text.
180. If White and Summers mean that consumers receive benefits not paid for, they are wrong.
To the contrary, sellers can sell more products and charge higher prices when they misrepresent
a product's qualities. Sellers do not offer discounts to those who have not "relied" on a
warranty. If they can avoid warranty obligations, they will be unjustly enriched. See infra notes
193-200 and accompanying text.
181. See supranotes 127-53 and accompanying text.
182. Id.
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which the purchaser was indifferent-even if the purchaser later concluded that
the terms were important. Only those terms that, in some fashion, induced the
buyer to purchase the product would be enforceable. Anything in contract, no
matter how critical at some later point, upon which the buyer did not rely at
the time of purchase would bar him or her from relief.
It is hard to believe that White and Summers would take such a hard line
with respect to what it takes to bind a party to contract terms. One presumes
that they believe that the rule they propose for interpreting section 2-313
would result in few successful challenges on the basis of reliance. Unfortunately, the likelihood of massive injustice under a strict reliance scheme is
great. However, even if the probability is low that defendants could block
warranty claims, fairness considerations lead to the conclusion that even a
small probability should not exist.
B. Tort Remedies as an Alternative Approach
White and Summers do not flatly reject providing legal relief to claimants
for sellers' representations. Rather, they prefer that such claims be pursued
in other ways."8 3 Nevertheless, the authors' alternative approach is not as
helpful as one might think. First, as Heckman notes, "implied warranties can
be, and frequently are, disclaimed, " " leaving buyers unprotected against
sellers' false promises and misrepresentations. Second, section 402B of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts," which White and Summers refer to as
establishing a cause of action for sellers' misrepresentations, fails to provide

183. When speaking of postsale representations, for example, White and Summers state:
We find enough vitality and merit in the reliance requirement that we would not
find such post-deal representations to be warranties under 2-313 unless they could be
proved as modifications under the terms of 2-209. However, a buyer would not
necessarily be deprived of all recourse against his seller on a post-deal statement that
misled him but did not qualify as a warranty. Like any advertiser, the seller might
be liable in tort to those he misleads by his advertising. In most cases, we would
send the buyer who had relied on a post-sale representation down the tort road.
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 3, at 403 (footnote omitted).
184. See Heckman, supra note 5, at 39.
185. Section 402B states:
One engaged in the business of selling chattels who, by advertising, labels, or
otherwise, makes to the public a misrepresentation of a material fact concerning the
character or quality of a chattel sold by him is subject to liability for physical harm
to a consumer of the chattel caused by justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation,
even though
(a) it is not made fraudulently or negligently, and
(b) the consumer has not bought the chattel from or entered into any contractual
relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B (1965).
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adequate protection to injured consumers.186 Although subsequent users of
a product who have suffered injuries need not show reliance under this section,
the section requires that the original purchaser relied on the misrepresentation."
Unfortunately, requiring the original purchaser to demonstrate
reliance dooms many valid claims."'8
Of course, consumers need not use tort law alone, but rather, can use
both tort and contract law. The distinction between the two areas of law is
increasingly artificial.
The common law lawyer, steeped in the tradition of treating warranty
coverage solely as a matter of contract, may object to [unread advertisements' being considered warranties]. How can a buyer claim the
consensual protection of an affirmation or a promise when the buyer
knows nothing of the affirmation or promise? Posing the question in this
way overlooks the history of warranty protection. The buyer sues "on a
contract" only because the legal system has forced him to classify his
cause of action as contract or tort. What is involved are a product and an
injury, either to a person or to property. The court's task is to determine
whether that injury was caused by a defect in the product, and any
statements made by the seller designed to induce the public to buy his
product are relevant in making this determination. The "basis of the
bargain" includes the dickered terms, but is not limited to them. The
"basis of the bargain" is also the item purchased, and a part of that
bargain includes the statements which the seller made about what he
sold.189

The critical need is to provide recovery to those injured by sellers'
misrepresentations. The particular legal theory invoked is less important.
Express warranty theory is perfectly appropriate as a vehicle for recovery.
After all, section 2-313 applies only when sellers, by their own actions, have
created warranties." 9 If a seller does not want to give a warranty, that
seller need only refrain from offering affirmations of fact or making promises.
If the seller chooses to make such promises or affirmations then the seller
should be accountable if his or her affirmations or promises are false.

186. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 149.
187. Id. at 150 (citing comment j of § 402B).
188. See supra notes 127-53 and accompanying text.
189. NORDSTROM, supranote 5, at 209 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
190. There is, of course, always room to debate whether a given statement or promise
constitutes a warranty or merely a "puff." That debate should be considered independently. The
question here is whether those statements that clearly constitute warranties should be enforceable
by purchasers who have not relied upon them.
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C. Pricing and Express Warranties
Without delving deeply into economic theory, one can fashion a pricing
argument that strongly supports abandoning reliance. It runs as follows.
One of the major reasons that sellers provide express warranties is to
induce consumers to purchase their products. A product sold without a
warranty, other things being equal, will command a lower price than one sold
with a warranty. Similarly, sellers who claim that a product has more
favorable qualities than it actually has will be able to charge a premium for
that product. If this were not so, sellers would not constantly be tempted to
make inflated claims about their products. To permit a seller, through
misrepresentations in advertising, to sell more products at higher prices, but
to deny relief to buyers who cannot prove reliance provides unjust enrichment
for deceptive sales practices.
Sellers actually charge the same price to all purchasers whether or not the
purchasers relied on a warranty. Yet, if the courts require reliance, sellers
will have far fewer obligations to the "nonreliers" than to the "reliers."
Therefore, purchasers will have been unfairly required to pay for rights they
never received.' 91 Accordingly, sellers who have made affirmations of fact
or promises to the public should be held accountable even to nonreliers.
The Supreme Court recently applied somewhat similar reasoning in Basic
Inc. v. Levinson,'1 a case involving a group of shareholders who sold stock
at a lower price than it was worth after a corporation had issued three public
statements falsely denying that it was engaged in merger negotiations. The
shareholders sued for fraud under the 1934 Securities Act. In response, the
defendants argued that the shareholders should have been required to prove
that they relied on these false statements when they sold their stock. In
rejecting the defendants' argument, Justice Blackmun wrote that the courts
could generally presume reliance in these situations:
The courts below accepted a presumption, created by the fraud-on-themarket theory and subject to rebuttal by petitioners, that persons who had
traded Basic shares had done so in reliance on the integrity of the price set
by the market, but because of petitioners' material misrepresentations that
price had been fraudulently depressed. Requiring a plaintiff to show a
speculative state of facts, i.e., how he would have acted if omitted material

191. Of course, a seller might flip the argument and counter that the nonrelier is paying a
purposefully low cost that accounts for the seller's lack of duties while the relier is receiving a
windfall for his diligence. However, this argument assumes that the seller has included a
warranty without a corresponding increase in the price, essentially giving security away for free
on the assumption that no one will take advantage of the situation. The reality of market
economics forecloses this explanation of the transaction.
192. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
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or if the misrepresentation had not
information had been disclosed.
would place an unnecessarily unrealistic evidentiary
been made, ...
burden 1on
the Rule lOb-5 plaintiff who has traded on an impersonal
93
market.
Notably, the Basic court did provide defendants with an opportunity to
rebut the presumption of reliance." 9 The Basic court's rebuttable presumption of reliance, however, should not be confused with the Third Circuit's test
Cipollone required proof by the
in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. 9
plaintiff that, prior to purchasing a product, the plaintiff "read, heard, saw or
knew of" the representation. 9 6 Only after receiving such proof did the
Third Circuit permit the burden to shift to the defendant to demonstrate with
clear, affirmative proof that "the buyer knew that the affirmation of fact or
promise was untrue. "9

In sharp contrast, the Supreme Court in Basic did not require proof that
the plaintiffs themselves knew about the material misrepresentations. In fact,
it seems clear that evidence demonstrating the plaintiffs' complete ignorance
regarding the defendants' misrepresentations would not have changed the Basic
court's view. The critical factor to the court was that the market had relied
on the defendants' misrepresentations, thereby affecting the price of the
shares.' 98 The only credible rebuttal evidence to the court would be information demonstrating that the misrepresentation "in fact did not lead to a
distortion of price or that an individual plaintiff traded or would have traded
despite his knowing the statement was false." 99
Extending this reasoning to express warranties, if the seller has made
representations to the public through advertising then individual buyers should

193. Id. at 245 (citations omitted).
194. Id. at 250.
195. 893 F.2d 541, 567 (3d cir. 1990), rev'd in part, 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).

196. Id. at 567.
197. Id. at 568.
198. According to the court:
In face-to-face transactions, the inquiry into an investor's reliance upon information
is into the subjective pricing of that information by that investor. With the presence
of a market, the market is interposed between seller and buyer and, ideally, transmits
information to the investor in the processed form of a market price. Thus the market
is performing a substantial part of the valuation process performed by the investor in
a face-to-face transaction. The market is acting as the unpaid agent of the investor,
informing him that given all the information available to it, the value of the stock is
worth the market price.
485 U.S. at 244 (quoting In re LTV Securities Litigation, 88 F.R.D. 134, 143 (N.D. Tex.
1980)).
199. Id. at 248 (citing Levison v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 750 n.6 (6th Cir. 1986), vacated
and remanded, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1994

41

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 3
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:429

not have to show that they personally relied to pursue a warranty claim. A
seller should be able to invalidate a warranty claim only by showing: (1) that
the buyer would have bought the product even knowing that the claims were
false or (2) that the price of the product did not reflect the seller's representations. 2 °
Applying this approach would mean that section 2-313 should provide
nonrelying buyers the same express warranty fights as relying buyers. As a
defense, the seller could prove that the nonrelying buyers paid a lower price
than the relying buyers because no warranty was provided to the nonrelying
buyers. To prevail on a nonreliance defense, sellers would have to prove
more than a buyer's ignorance of a seller's representations. When sellers have
made affirmations of fact or promises to the public but then seek to avoid
accountability, sellers should have the burden of proving that the buyers would
have paid the same price for the product even without the affirmations or
promises, or that the sellers gave a discount to those getting no warranty. A
recent American Bar Association task force analysis reached this conclusion
while analyzing proposals to reform Article 2 of the U.C.C.:
Why should a buyer who has not read an advertisement or an owner's
manual not have the advantage of a warranty when he is paying the same
price as one who has read the advertisement or owner's manual and will
have warranty protection? A warrantor who publishes affirmations which
pass beyond the line of puffing must contemplate the possibility that every
potential purchaser will read and rely on them. Presumably, that
warrantor, engaging in such activity to induce reliance and promote sales,
will price its product to include the cost of the warranty. Why should it
not be required to stand behind its affirmations even if an individual buyer
has not demonstrated direct reliance? 2 01
This argument has a cynical response that should be rejected. Mass
merchandising sellers, knowing that most buyers would fail a reliance test and
not be eligible for warranty protection, might set lower prices for their
products than they would set if they had to live up to their warranties. Public
policy surely ought to reject such an utterly irresponsible and deceptive
approach to providing warranties.

200. This second requirement is, as it should be, a difficult requirement to meet.
201. Task Force of the A.B.A. Subcommittee on General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers,
and Documents 6f Title, Committee on the Uniform Commercial Code, A.B.A., An Appraisal

of the March 1, 1990, PreliminaryReport of the Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 Study
Group, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 981, 1102 (1991).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss3/3

42

1994]

Adler: The Last Best Argument for Eliminating Reliance from Express Warr
ELIMINATING RELIANCE ON EXPRESS WARRANTIES

D. The Limits of Express Warranties
One concern about abandoning reliance is whether sellers will be bound
to offer warranty rights to all buyers for every representation they have ever
made about their product. If buyers can avail themselves of warranty
protections even when they have never seen the seller's representations, what
prevents them from claiming rights from every statement - no matter how
distant in the past or how far in the future - made by the seller about its
products?
While no simple answer exists, there surely are some limits. First, if a
seller has merely made a "puff" about a product, no warranty liability should
attach.'
Only when the seller's representation rises to the level of an
affirmation of fact or promise under section 2-313 of the U.C.C. should it be
considered a warranty. Even in this case, some circumstances might
demonstrate that the representations did not constitute part of the basis of the
bargain.
For example, one circumstance that would eliminate a representation from
being the basis of the bargain is staleness. If the seller can demonstrate that
its "statements [were] made so long before the contract of purchase that a
reasonable person in the place of the buyer ought to have realized that the
seller's past representations were no longer applicable,"2 3 then the seller
should not have to stand behind those statements.
Another circumstance that would protect sellers is the explicit exclusion
of particular products from warranty claims. Murray offers the following
example: "[l]f the seller has made a statement relating to one model of the
goods, and the buyer indicates an interest in another model, the seller's
statement that the second model does not have the feature attributed to the first
is an obvious withdrawal of the express warranty. "'
Another situation, a subset of explicit exclusions, is the exclusion of
certain geographic areas from the coverage of a warranty. For example, a
product that performs fully only in warm weather climates should not be held
to perform in cold weather if the seller has made clear in its promotional
materials that the claims are good only in warm weather. 5
In short, a seller can easily control the coverage of express warranties.
By setting clear and conspicuous boundaries and disclaimers, the seller can
expand or limit the warranties offered. If a seller does not want to face
excessive warranty claims, then the seller should not make unjustifiable
representations -about a product.

202. For a description of "puffing," see U.C.C. § 2-313(2).
203. NORDSTROM, supra note 5, at 211-12.
204. Murray, supranote 3, at 323.
205. For an extensive discussion of such an example, see Lewis, supra note 3, at 692-93.
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VI. A WORKABLE TEST
Because the words and comments of section 2-313 do not provide clear
direction with respect to reliance, policy considerations help provide a proper
interpretation of the section. The case for eliminating reliance is the stronger
argument.
If one accepts the validity and implications of the FTC studies and other
marketing studies, then one quickly abandons the notion of retaining reliance.
Any test that requires proof by consumers that they knew, even in a general
fashion, the terms of an express warranty will guarantee that the vast majority
of purchasers will lose all express warranty protection.
The fairest test is a simple one: Buyers who can demonstrate that they fit
into the class of persons to whom an affirmation of fact or promise has been
targeted should be permitted to claim the benefits of the affirmations or
promises under section 2-313's "part of the basis of the bargain" language.
Only if the seller can demonstrate that the buyer was not affected by such
representations or that the buyer's purchase price did not in any way rest upon
the representations should the seller escape warranty liability.
A. CurrentDraft Revisions of Section 2-313
Unfortunately, efforts to reform section 2-313 of the Code do not go far
enough. Currently, a discussion draft of this section circulated by the
American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws still permits sellers to exclude warranty coverage for
advertisements when the sellers can demonstrate that buyers were not aware
of the advertisements. As redrafted, section 2-313 would read as follows:
(a) Subject to subsection (b):
(1) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the
buyer which relates to the goods becomes part of the agreement
between them and creates an express warranty that the goods will
conform to the affirmation or promise. To create an express warranty
by affirmation or promise it is not necessary that the seller use formal
words, such as "warrant" or "guarantee," or have a specific intention
to make a warranty.
(2) Any description of the goods made or any sample or model
displayed or exhibited by the seller to the buyer becomes part of the
agreement between them and creates an express warranty that the
goods will conform to the description or that the whole of the goods
will conform to the sample or model.
(3) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by a seller, including
a manufacturer, to the public which relates to goods to be sold creates
an express warranty to any buyer that the goods will conform to the
affirmation or promise, whether or not the express warranty is part of
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss3/3
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the agreement between the buyer and its immediate seller. Subject to
Section 2-318, the buyer may enforce the express warranty directly
against the seller.
(b) If the seller proves by clear and convincing evidence that the buyer
was unreasonable in concluding under subsection (a) that the affirmation,
promise, description, or sample became part2 of6 the agreement or was made
to the public, no express warranty is made. D
As revised, the section jettisons the exasperatingly ambiguous words
"basis of the bargain" and states directly that affirmations of fact or promises
made by the seller to the buyer which relate to the goods become part of the
agreement between the parties. Even more helpful, subsection (a)(3) indicates
that affirmations of fact or promises made to the public by the seller about the
goods create express warranties to any buyer of the goods whether or not the
express warranties are part of the agreement between the buyer and the
immediate seller.
Although one might be tempted to celebrate what appears to be the demise
of reliance, the Reporter's Note provides a troubling interpretation of this new
language:
The Cipollone cigarette litigation dealt with public advertising followed
by the purchase of cigarettes over an extended period of time. Assuming
that the ads were affirmations and promises about health, the Third Circuit
rejected the seller's argument that the buyer must prove that he or she
relied on them in purchasing the product. They became part of the basis
of the bargain without proof of reliance. On the other hand, the seller
should have an opportunity to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the buyer was not aware of the advertising or, if aware, did not believe or
otherwise rely upon it. This result is consistent with current text of and
comments to § 2-313, at least where there is privity of contract, and is
clearly expressed in revised § 2-313(a) & (b).
The revision, however, creates a conclusive presumption in public
advertising cases. See § 2-313(a)(3). If the advertising is current at the
time of contracting and other buyers were aware of and believed it, there
is no reason to protect the seller against claims by buyers who purchased
without information or with disbelief. All buyers paid a market price for
an advertised product, and the seller should be held to the public warranties made. This result avoids the proof problems in particular cases and
puts the responsibility on the person best able to make decisions about how
much to advertise, the seller. The seller, however, may establish my [sic]
clear and convincing evidence that no express warranty was made to the

206. U.C.C. § 2-313 (Proposed Official Draft September 10, 1993 draft).
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public.2M
The creation of a conclusive presumption in public advertising cases,
although a significant step towards abolishing reliance, does not go far enough.
By its terms, the presumption applies only to affirmations or promises made
to the public through advertising.
By negative implication, one might
conclude that it would not apply in other circumstances, for example, to
written warranties included inside a product's packaging.
The written
warranty may never have been publicly advertised. Does the seller remain
free to challenge claims by buyers who never knew whether they obtained a
warranty at the time of purchase and who waited six months before reading a
written warranty accompanying the product? One hopes that revisions in the
Reporter's Notes will explain that the revised section 2-313 protects the buyer
in the nonadvertising cases to the same extent that it protects the buyer in
public advertising cases.
Moreover, although privity under section 2-318 of the Code falls outside
the scope of this article, one cannot avoid noting and objecting to the reference
to revised section 2-318's exclusion of family members, bystanders, and the
like from express warranty protection. 8 Expanding the scope of express
warranties hardly helps consumers if the class of consumers protected is
radically narrowed.
B. A PreferredApproach
A preferred approach to the revised section suggested above abandons
reliance completely. One possible way to word the section is as follows:
(a) Subject to subsection (b), any affirmation of fact or promise made
by the seller to the buyer or to the public that relates to the goods, or any
description, or any sample or model, of the goods becomes part of the
agreement between them and creates an express warranty that the goods
shall conform to the affirmation or promise or the description, sample, or
model unless, in the case of affirmations or promises made through
advertising, the buyer was not a person or part of a class of persons
targeted by the seller's advertising. If the buyer was such a person or part
of a class of such persons targeted by the seller's advertising, the buyer
need not demonstrate that the buyer saw or relied upon the affirmation or
promise in the advertising prior to purchasing the product in order to have
the express warranty made to the buyer.
(b) If the seller proves by clear and convincing evidence that the

207. Id. at Reporter's Note.
208. Id. § 2-318.
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buyer was not a person targeted by the seller's advertising, no express
warranty is made to the buyer.
The benefit of this wording to the buyer is the clarification that the buyer
need not rely in order to receive warranty rights. The benefit to the seller is
equally strong. To prevent unreasonable or excessive warranty claims, a seller
need only clarify the limits of an ad with respect to expiration date, geographical area, type of purchaser, or any other point of demarcation the seller
wishes. Otherwise, the seller is liable for the warranty claims it makes to all
of those whom the seller targeted as potential customers and who actually
made purchases.
VII. CONCLUSION
It remains difficult to convince observers that requiring reliance in express
warranties potentially works a massive injustice on buyers. Only upon
reflection and examination of the way the marketplace actually operates can
one see that the time has come to abandon reliance. Doing so does not open
the floodgates to ill-conceived warranty claims. To the contrary, sellers can
always tailor their representations to fit those, and only those, whom they wish
to include as recipients of express warranty protection. Moreover, retaining
reliance provides crafty sellers with the means to take advantage of their
misrepresentations to the public and avoid the consequences of their misrepresentations in more cases than is justified. The law should now recognize this
injustice and remove the strict reliance requirement from express warranty
suits.
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